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DEBORAH W. DENNO*
In 2008, with Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court broke decades of silence
regarding state execution methods to declare Kentucky’s lethal injection proto-
col constitutional, yet the opinion itself did not offer much guidance. In the six
years after Baze, legal challenges to lethal injection soared as states scrambled
to quell litigation by modifying their lethal injection protocols. My unprec-
edented study of over 300 cases citing Baze reveals that such modifications
have occurred with alarming frequency. Moreover, even as states purportedly
rely on the Baze opinion, they have changed their lethal injection protocols in
inconsistent ways that bear little resemblance to the original protocol evaluated
in Baze and even differ from one execution to the next within the same state.
States’ continuous tinkering often affects already-troubled aspects of their lethal
injection procedures. The compendium of these deficiencies has led to some of
the most glaring failures in lethal injection history.
An even more disturbing revelation relates to the lethal injection drugs used
in these rapidly changing protocols. Recent drug shortages threaten many
states’ abilities to carry out executions, and this Article presents evidence of the
unfettered substitutions states have made in their desperate attempts to adhere
to their execution schedules. These attempts include frequent drug switches that
take place quickly, without oversight, and based purely on convenience and
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availability. The resulting unreliability and randomness heighten the risk that
the execution process will violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. As that risk increases, so does the tendency for states to
retreat into secrecy regarding their lethal injection protocols.
For a growing number of states, alternative protocols also incorporate the
use of compounding pharmacies to produce lethal injection drugs. Tradition-
ally, compounding pharmacies are non-FDA regulated, small-scale pharmacies
that make customized drugs on an as-needed basis in response to individualized
prescriptions. This trend toward using compounding pharmacies is highly prob-
lematic. For example, state regulations are paltry. They also tend to differ from
one state to the next, making it difficult to ensure that compounded drugs are
held to consistently high standards of quality, safety, and effectiveness. Evidence
shows, however, that proposed and newly adopted federal legislation regulating
these pharmacies may create major obstacles for the use of compounded drugs
in executions, leaving states without even this risky recourse.
Death-penalty opponents and medical professionals have long objected to
lethal injection on the basis that the use of drugs to carry out executions links
death to the practice of medicine. Ironically, that reliance on drugs may end up
accomplishing what countless legal challenges could not: drug shortages have
devastated this country’s execution process to an unparalleled degree. Rather
than masking the “machinery of death,” the mimicry of medicine may end up
dismantling it.
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INTRODUCTION
Lethal injection has been a controversial method of execution since its
inception in 1977, with many critics focusing on problems with the three-drug
protocol traditionally used by most death-penalty states.1 By 2007, the growing
number of legal challenges and the variance among state responses resulted in a
sufficient number of circuit splits for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to
review the issue.2 The Court chose Baze v. Rees, a Kentucky case, to determine
the future direction of lethal injection.3 In Baze, a 7-2 decision with a plurality
opinion,4 the Court upheld the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection
protocol under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.5
The Court found that the defendants had failed to show that Kentucky’s
three-drug combination posed a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk
of “serious harm”6 compared to “known and available alternatives.”7 The
typical formula, which Kentucky was then using, consists of a serial sequence
of three drugs: sodium thiopental, a barbiturate anesthetic that brings about deep
unconsciousness; pancuronium bromide, a total muscle relaxant that paralyzes
all voluntary muscles and causes suffocation; and potassium chloride, a toxin
1. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 40–63 (2008) (plurality opinion) (examining the issues concerning
the three-drug protocol). For a detailed discussion of these problems and developments over the
decades, see Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV.
319, 373–400 (1997) [hereinafter Denno, Getting to Death]; Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection
Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 51–101 (2007)
[hereinafter Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary]; Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate
Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It
Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 90–141 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, When Legislatures Delegate].
2. Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death Penalty in the
United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 802–03 (2008).
3. 553 U.S. at 40–41.
4. Chief Justice John Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in
which Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito joined, id. at 40–63; Justice Alito filed a concurring
opinion, id. at 63–71; Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, id. at
71–87; Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Clarence
Thomas joined, id. at 87–93; Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice
Scalia joined, id. at 94–107; Justice Stephen Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, id. at
107–13; and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice David Souter
joined, id. at 113–23.
5. Id. at 41 (plurality opinion). The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
6. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id. at 61.
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that induces irreversible cardiac arrest.8
A primary concern in Baze, and lethal injection challenges generally, rested
with the second drug, pancuronium bromide. Without adequate anesthesia,
pancuronium can cause an inmate excruciating pain and suffering because the
inmate slowly suffocates from the drug’s effects while paralyzed and unable to
cry out. The inmate’s agony increases dramatically when executioners inject the
third drug, potassium chloride, which creates an intense and unbearable burn-
ing.9 The Baze Court agreed that if the sodium thiopental is ineffective, it would
be reprehensible to inject the second and third drugs into a conscious person.10
A key issue in litigation was whether prison officials and executioners can
determine if an inmate is aware and in torment because pancuronium is such a
powerful mask of emotions.11 Starting in 2006, this litigation so successfully
prompted death-penalty moratoria and execution stalemates across the country
that a Supreme Court case like Baze appeared inevitable.12
Yet in many ways, Baze was a puzzling choice. Kentucky had conducted only
one execution by lethal injection and thus offered an extremely limited record
on which to base a lethal injection challenge. Other states had far better
evidentiary and execution data.13 Moreover, the suit that petitioners brought had
not been scrutinized by the federal hearings being carried out in similar kinds of
cases. Rather, Kentucky’s hearings took place only in state court and concerned
only Kentucky’s procedures and short execution history.14 Some death-penalty
opponents came to believe that the Justices who voted to hear Baze did so only
because they “regarded the challenge as insubstantial and wanted to dispose of
it before many more state and federal courts could be tied up with similar
cases.”15
However, the Baze opinion had quite the opposite effect. Limits to the Baze
Court’s analysis suggest that the decision is by no means a definitive response to
the issue of lethal injection’s constitutionality.16 In fact, Baze was so splintered
that none of its seven opinions garnered more than three votes,17 and the
8. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701,
702 (2008).
9. Baze, 553 U.S. at 53–54 (plurality opinion); Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at
55–56.
10. Baze, 553 U.S. at 53 (plurality opinion) (“It is uncontested that, failing a proper dose of sodium
thiopental that would render the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unaccept-
able risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of
potassium chloride.”).
11. Id. at 53–61.
12. Dieter, supra note 2, at 800–08.
13. Adam Liptak, Challenges Remain for Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/04/17/washington/17lethal.html.
14. Dieter, supra note 2, at 803–04.
15. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Chilly to Bid to Alter Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/us/08scotus.html.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Justices offered a wide range of explanations and qualifications in their reason-
ing.18 In addition, the decision was confined to Kentucky and its particular
protocol. Voices on both sides of the death-penalty debate have emphasized that
Baze left doors open for future lethal injection challenges.19 Even members of
the Baze Court itself anticipated the repercussions of the opinion’s shortcom-
ings: in separate concurrences, Justices Stevens,20 Thomas,21 and Alito22 ex-
pressed concern that the Baze decision would only lead to additional debate and
litigation. Until now, however, criticisms and concerns regarding developments
in lethal injection protocols after Baze have been largely predictive.
This Article provides facts where there has been only foresight. I present the
results of a unique empirical study in which I collected and analyzed over 300
cases citing Baze in the first five years since the decision (2008–2013). My
analysis of these cases indicates that states can—and do—modify virtually any
aspect of their lethal injection procedures with a frequency that is unprec-
edented among execution methods in this country’s history. There have been
more changes in lethal injection protocols during the past five years than there
have been in the last three decades. The resulting protocols differ from state to
state and even from one execution to the next within the same state. As a result,
many states’ lethal injection issues and procedures scarcely resemble those
evaluated by the Baze Court. Furthermore, this continuous tinkering often
affects already-troubled aspects of states’ lethal injection procedures, such as
the paltry qualifications of executioners, the absence of medical experts, and the
failure to account for the difficulties with injecting inmates whose drug-use
histories diminish the availability of usable veins.23 Despite states’ efforts to
improve their procedures, such deficiencies have led to some of the most glaring
and gruesome failures ever documented in the history of lethal injection.24
Baze ushered in a perfect storm for litigation. Although the Supreme Court’s
grant of certiorari in Baze was remarkable given the Court’s long history of
silence regarding the constitutionality of execution methods, Baze did little to
resolve the problems that plagued lethal injection prior to 2008. The Baze
Court’s vague and diffuse Eighth Amendment analysis engendered greater
coverage of lethal injection research and litigation in medical journals, as well
18. For an analysis of the different opinions in Baze, see generally Deborah W. Denno, For
Execution Methods Challenges, the Road to Abolition Is Paved with Paradox, in THE ROAD TO
ABOLITION? THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 183 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. &
Austin Sarat eds., 2009).
19. Liptak, supra note 13 (citing commentators’ responses to Baze).
20. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“When we granted certiorari in
this case, I assumed that our decision would bring the debate about lethal injection as a method of
execution to a close. It now seems clear that it will not.”).
21. Id. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the weaknesses and vagueness of the Baze
Court’s decision would be “sure to engender more litigation”).
22. Id. at 71 (Alito, J., concurring) (warning that “[t]he Court should not produce a de facto ban on
capital punishment by adopting method-of-execution rules that lead to litigation gridlock”).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra notes 159, 205, 311–12 and accompanying text.
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as controversy over physician involvement. Combined with widely publicized
botched executions, the lethal injection debate after Baze encompassed prob-
lems even worse and more varied than those that existed before the Court’s
intervention.25 Yet no one—not even the more prescient Justices of the Baze
Court—could have foreseen the more pragmatic threats to the continuation of
executions that were to come with rampant drug shortages that started after
Baze was decided.26
As death-penalty states face the daunting reality of diminishing or depleted
drug supplies and ever-increasing restrictions on drug importation, they are
struggling to match their protocols to drug availability.27 Some states have put
lethal injection executions on hold until the drug situation is resolved,28 while
others have turned to the U.S. Department of Justice for help.29 Many continue
to search for manufacturers that will agree to produce drugs for lethal injections.
As states’ desperation increases, so does their tolerance for risk.30 Most recently,
death-penalty states have pinned their hopes on “compounded” drugs, individu-
alized prescription medications created in facilities referred to as “compounding
pharmacies.” Unlike commercial pharmaceutical manufacturers, which are regu-
lated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and subject to intense
oversight,31 compounding pharmacies (and pharmacies generally) are regulated
relatively permissively by the states.32
Over the past few decades, however, the FDA has discovered a disturbing
trend in which compounding pharmacies capitalize on their ability to produce
25. See infra section II.B.
26. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-194, DRUG SHORTAGES: PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT
CONTINUES, DESPITE EFFORTS TO HELP ENSURE PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 14 fig.4, 21 (2014) (charting the
number of active drug shortages from January 2007 through June 2013 and finding that the immediate
cause of drug shortages is traceable to slow or halted production of drugs). Hospira, Inc. was among the
manufacturers interviewed for the GAO report. Id. at 65.
27. See infra Parts III, IV.
28. See Kimberly Leonard, Lethal Injection Drug Access Could Put Executions on Hold, CENTER FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (July 11, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/04/04/8589/lethal-injection-
drug-access-could-put-executions-hold.
29. See Bill Mears, States Urge Feds to Help Import Lethal Injection Drugs, CNN (May 21, 2012,
7:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/21/politics/states-lethal-injection-drugs (citing a statement re-
leased by the state attorneys general from fifteen states asking for help, noting that “[a]t the very core of
the states’ police powers are their powers to enact laws to protect their citizens against violent crimes”
and “[a]s state attorneys general, we are tasked with enforcing those laws, including in instances where
capital punishment is authorized for the most heinous of crimes”).
30. See Meredith Clark, US Execution Strategy Threatened by Drug Shortfall, MSNBC (May 3,
2013, 11:20 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/melissa-harris-perry/us-execution-strategy-threatened-drug-
shor.
31. See STAFF OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATE OF DISARRAY: HOW
STATES’ INABILITY TO OVERSEE COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES PUTS PUBLIC HEALTH AT RISK 6 (2013), available
at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did735130 (reporting the responses to an investigation which exam-
ined the state oversight of compounding pharmacies).
32. See Jesse M. Boodoo, Compounding Problems and Compounding Confusion: Federal Regula-
tion of Compounded Drug Products and the FDAMA Circuit Split, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 220, 232–34
(2010).
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and sell large batches of medications to a broad market without meeting the
stringent safety and efficacy standards required of commercial drug manufactur-
ers. Essentially, these facilities act like large-scale pharmaceutical companies
while hiding behind small-scale pharmacy licenses.33 This practice has had, at
times, disastrous results.
For example, in early October 2012, a contaminated steroid produced by a
compounding pharmacy in Massachusetts led to a fungal meningitis outbreak
that has killed a total of sixty-four people and sickened hundreds more.34 This
tragedy led the FDA to inspect thirty-one compounding pharmacies over the
next six months, whereby the FDA made a series of disturbing discoveries
concerning the pharmacies’ lack of safeguards.35 Moreover, an April 2013 study
released by the U.S. House of Representatives revealed that almost all states
provide overall ineffective oversight and regulation of the compounding pharma-
cies within their borders. In response to these findings, legislation has been
proposed that would require FDA approval of not only pharmacies engaged in
interstate commerce, but also those involved in high-risk compounding.36
As the FDA continues to explore ways to increase oversight of compounding
pharmacies, state pharmacy boards have also been working on their own to
increase their regulatory oversight in response to the negative focus on com-
pounding pharmacies after the meningitis outbreak. Proposed state regulations
include stricter requirements for both local compounding pharmacies and out-of-
state pharmacies that cross state lines, clearer definitions of compounding,
additional inspection protocols, and the installment or improvement of prescrip-
tion-monitoring programs.37
33. See OFFICE OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMPOUNDING PHARMA-
CIES: COMPOUNDING RISK 5 (2012), available at http://www.snmmi.org/files/docs/Compounding
%20Pharmacies%20-%20Compounding%20Risk%20FINAL_0_1382017898361_1.pdf (addressing
current regulatory oversight and gaps in legal authority over compounding pharmacies in response to
the fungal meningitis outbreak in Boston); Editorial, Fix ‘Compounding Pharmacy’ Oversight: Our
View, USA TODAY (Apr. 28, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/04/28/
compounding-pharmacy-fda-editorials-debates/2119621.
34. See Multi-State Meningitis Outbreak—Current Case Count, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 23, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis-map-large.html.
For more information on the meningitis outbreak and the continually developing outcomes, see
Scott Gottlieb, Compounding a Crisis at FDA, FORBES (May 24, 2013, 8:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/scottgottlieb/2013/05/24/compounding-a-crisis-at-fda/.
35. See Margaret A. Hamburg, Proactive Inspections Further Highlight Need for New Authorities for
Pharmacy Compounding, FDA VOICE (Apr. 11, 2013), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2013/04/
proactive-inspections-further-highlight-need-for-new-authorities-for-pharmacy-compounding/; Sum-
mary: 2013 FDA Pharmacy Inspection Assignment, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Guidance
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm347722.htm (last updated Jan. 9, 2014);
see also infra notes 261–62 and accompanying text (listing the extent of the problems).
36. See STAFF OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 31, at 2–3.
37. See Andrew Pollack, Checks Find Unsafe Practices at Compounding Pharmacies, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2013, at A12; see also Kara Nett Hinkley, Compounding Interest, ST. LEGISLATURES, June 2013,
at 22, 23, available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles/2013/SL_0613-
Compounding.pdf; State Regulation of Compounding Pharmacies, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/regulating-compounding-pharmacies.aspx (last updated Jan. 2014).
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If any compounded lethal injection drugs are considered high risk—and they
possibly could be—then the compounding pharmacies that produce them will
be subject to FDA oversight. The new regulations may require public disclosure
of all the drugs the pharmacies produce, to whom they intend to sell them, and
advance evidence of individual prescriptions. The FDA, in turn, may be re-
quired to share information on inspected compounding pharmacies with rel-
evant state agencies. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, several of the
proposed restrictions may effectively negate altogether the ability of compound-
ing pharmacies to produce lethal injection drugs.
Thus, death-penalty states could be confronted with an ironic outcome in
which their quest for lethal injection drugs is thwarted both by the problems and
the proposed solutions associated with the regulation of compounding pharma-
cies. The historically dismal safety standards and haphazard daily practices of
many compounding pharmacies all but invite lethal injection challenges, while
public-health calamities such as the meningitis outbreak make increased regula-
tion inevitable. Death-penalty states have an unsettling tendency to retreat into
secrecy with respect to execution protocols and source materials when legal
challenges appear threatening, yet currently proposed regulations may hinder
such retreat.
In sum, Baze v. Rees—the Supreme Court’s only opinion on the constitutional-
ity of lethal injection—failed to answer significant questions, and many of the
issues that the Court did consider have been subsumed by new legal and
practical challenges. The future of lethal injection remains unclear. This Article
is intended to be a point-in-time snapshot of the rapidly changing factors
affecting the use of lethal injection in the United States. Part I of this Article
briefly describes the history of lethal injection methods and provides a founda-
tion for the current debate regarding lethal injection drugs. Part II discusses the
role of Baze as precedent, supporting the remarkable assertion that Baze has
been rendered mostly irrelevant merely five years after its issuance. Part II also
discusses legal challenges after Baze as well as states’ attempts to quell litiga-
tion by switching their lethal injection protocols from three-drug to one-drug
procedures. Part III explains how these legal challenges have been overshad-
owed by an even bigger obstacle to lethal injection: unanticipated national
shortages in lethal injection drugs, which have resulted in a new wave of
litigation and protocol changes. Part IV reveals the dangers associated with
states’ attempts to address those shortages by seeking compounded drugs from
pharmacies that lack federal oversight and explains how new regulations may
impede states’ increasingly frantic efforts to procure lethal injection drugs. Part
V explores the trend toward secrecy that has accompanied these efforts as states
attempt to protect the identities and conceal the dangers of their drug sources,
even as the risks associated with compounding pharmacies seem to demand
increased transparency. Part V also emphasizes the likelihood that new com-
pounding pharmacy regulations will promote such transparency. This Article
concludes by condemning states’ efforts to retreat into secrecy regarding execu-
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tion practices. Such efforts thwart any attempt to address problems with lethal
injection and only further contribute to the chaos. Transparency regarding lethal
injection procedures is a desirable and constitutionally sound outcome for the
public, if not for the states that will have to begin yet again the search for drugs
to dole out death.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LETHAL INJECTION
This country’s adoption of lethal injection follows more than a century of
searching for humane methods of execution,38 starting with hanging and the
firing squad and then replaced by seemingly more acceptable techniques. The
increasingly modern quest for an execution method began with electrocution in
1890, then lethal gas in 1921, and, in an evolving pattern, ended in 1977 with
lethal injection.39 An analysis of lethal injection’s history, however, shows little
excuse for its adoption or its perpetuation. Lethal injection’s deficiencies per-
sisted over the decades yet were simply ignored.40 The State of New York
considered using one form of lethal injection (cyanide injection) as early as
1888,41 yet a state commission rejected that choice because the medical profes-
sion believed that the public would begin to link the practice of medicine to
death.42 Of course, this concern about lethal injection remains today.43
In 1953, Great Britain’s Royal Commission on Capital Punishment also
dismissed a form of lethal injection, concluding after a five-year study that
injection was no better than Great Britain’s long-standing method of execution
by hanging.44 The host of problems the Royal Commission detected with
lethal injection still exists, ranging from the physical limitations presented by
individuals with inaccessible veins to the recognition that lethal injection re-
quires medical skill because of the technique’s complexity.45 In 1976, the
United States started to examine the lethal injection issue more intently after the
38. See AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION 84
(2001) (referring to the “unending search for technologies that in their capacity to kill with a pretense of
humanity allow those who kill both to end life and, at the same time, to believe themselves to be the
guardians of a moral order that, in part, bases its claims to superiority in its condemnation of killing”).
39. For discussions of legislative changes in execution methods over time, see Deborah W. Denno,
Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineering of Death over the Century,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551, 559–77 (1994) [hereinafter Denno, Engineering of Death]; Denno,
Getting to Death, supra note 1, at 375–79; Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 59–75;
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 1, at 82–85, 90–92, 130–31, 188–206.
40. See generally Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1 (documenting the history and
perpetuation of lethal injection).
41. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE MOST HUMANE AND PRACTICAL
METHOD OF CARRYING INTO EFFECT THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN CAPITAL CASES 78, 85 (Albany, The Argus
Co. 1888).
42. See Denno, Engineering of Death, supra note 39, at 572–73.
43. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 80–81.
44. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT, 1949–1953, [Cmd.] 8932, at 258–61
(U.K.).
45. Id. at 258.
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Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia,46 a case that
marked the end of a nine-year pause in this country’s executions.47 Remarkably,
no state legislature addressed the evidence gathered and conclusions reached on
injection procedures either from the New York or British commissions.48
Such disregard for past medical investigations was clear in May 1977, when
Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection.49 An Oklahoma legis-
lator asked Jay Chapman, M.D., the state’s medical examiner, to create a lethal
injection protocol that the state could implement even though Dr. Chapman was
clear about his lack of expertise in fulfilling such a request.50 According to Dr.
Chapman, when lawmakers initially contacted him, his “first response was that
[he] was an expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them that way.”51
With virtually no scientific study or relevant medical background, Dr. Chap-
man quickly concocted the three-drug formula formerly used by Kentucky.52
Yet, within days of the Oklahoma legislature adopting his method, Chapman
warned the public of lethal injection’s hazards.53 In the Daily Oklahoman, for
example, he noted that “if the death-dealing drug is not administered properly,
the convict may not die and could be subjected to severe muscle pain.”54 Other
news articles at the time stressed the tentative status of Oklahoma’s protocol. A
1979 article in the Daily Oklahoman emphasized that “[o]fficials with the State
Department of Corrections say it may be years—if ever—before they are
required to carry out mandates of the 1977 Legislature.”55 The article also noted
that “[o]fficials feel that if and when they have to use the injection law, new and
better drugs may be available.”56 Such statements suggest that officials had
minimal confidence in the effectiveness of the chemicals that Dr. Chapman
introduced and even anticipated that they might never be applied.
Initial concerns over the lack of medical testing were sufficient to stall
Oklahoma’s lethal injection bill prior to state senate approval.57 At one point,
the Oklahoma legislature considered requiring that injection could not supplant
electrocution without being “ruled legal by the U.S. Supreme Court.”58 Legisla-
46. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion).
47. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 42 (2008) (plurality opinion).
48. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 65.
49. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 1, at 375.
50. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 66.
51. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting E-mail from A. Jay Chapman, Forensic Pathologist, Santa
Rosa, Cal., to author (Jan. 18, 2006) (on file with author)).
52. See id. at 66–75.
53. See Jim Killackey, Execution Drug Like Anesthesia, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 12, 1977, at 1.
54. Id.
55. See Jim Killackey, Officials Draw Grim Execution Scene, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 12, 1979,
at 1.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. See John Greiner, Drug Execution Plan Suffers Senate Setback, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 16,
1977, at 16 (explaining that one senator “apparently had drummed up enough votes to have killed the
bill had it been brought to a final vote” and noting the concerns of a former assistant district attorney
that “the legislature and the Senate should study [the bill] more carefully”).
58. See Mike Hammer, Drug Death Bill Passes, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 21, 1977, at 65.
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tive history indicates that lethal injection was not to be used quickly or
confidently, if at all.
Despite the benefits of hindsight, states did not medically improve upon the
lethal injection method that consistently had resulted in documented debacles.59
As the trial court in Baze v. Rees concluded in 2005, “there is scant evidence
that ensuing States’ adoption of lethal injection was supported by any additional
medical or scientific studies . . . . Rather, it is this Court’s impression that the
various States simply fell in line relying solely on Oklahoma’s protocol.”60
Indeed, after Oklahoma adopted the method, state after state followed suit. As
Chart 1 of this Article shows, thirty-nine states joined this movement between
59. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 64–117.
60. Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *2 (Ky. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2005), aff’d, 217
S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), aff’d, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
Chart 1
States Adopting Lethal Injection by Year: 1977–2014*
1977 Oklahoma ● Texas
1978 Idaho
1979 New Mexico
1981 Washington
1982 Massachusetts
1983 Arkansas ● Illinois ● Montana ● Nevada ● New Jersey ● North Carolina ● Utah
1984 Mississippi ● Oregon ● South Dakota ● Wyoming
1986 Delaware ● New Hampshire
1988 Colorado ● Missouri
1990 Louisiana ● Pennsylvania
1992 Arizona ● California
1993 Ohio1
1994 Kansas ● Maryland ● Virginia
1995 Connecticut ● Indiana ● New York ● South Carolina
1998 Kentucky ● Tennessee
2000 Florida ● Georgia
2002 Alabama
2009 Nebraska
1 In 2001, Ohio changed from a choice state to a single-method state.
* Information for this chart comes from the following sources: NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (2010); Deborah
W. Denno, For Execution Methods Challenges, the Road to Abolition Is Paved with Paradox, in THE ROAD TO
ABOLITION? THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 183, 188 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. &
Austin Sarat eds., 2009).
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1977 and 2009, switching to lethal injection like falling dominos. Many of these
states simply copied the language of Oklahoma’s lethal injection statute.61
The thirty-nine-state figure alone is remarkable. Even more extraordinary is
that six states, including Oklahoma, made the switch by 1982,62 the year this
country’s first lethal injection execution took place.63 Another seven states
changed in 1983 alone.64 Therefore, within a year of the country’s first lethal
injection execution, thirteen states—over one-third of all death-penalty states at
that time—had decided to engage in executions with the new method.65 In
addition, twelve states enacted lethal injection in the nine-year stretch from
1994, when Kansas, Maryland, and Virginia adopted the method, to 2002, when
Alabama did.66 Nebraska was a lone wolf, switching to lethal injection in 2009,
a year after the Nebraska Supreme Court finally declared electrocution unconsti-
tutional.67 By 2009, then, all death-penalty states in this country had switched to
lethal injection, either entirely or as an option,68 and nearly all states used a
protocol consisting of the same three drugs.69
Of the thirty-two death-penalty states that exist in mid-2014, lethal injection
is the sole method of execution in twenty-one states, as shown in Chart 2 of this
Article.70 Three states—Utah, Kentucky, and Tennessee—have also adopted
61. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 1, at 375; Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra
note 1, at 78; Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 1, at 92, 95–100.
62. See supra Chart 1 (showing that Idaho, New Mexico, Washington, and Massachusetts followed
the lead set by Oklahoma and Texas by adopting lethal injection before an actual execution took place).
63. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 1, at 375 (discussing the 1982 execution of Charles
Brooks, Jr. in Texas).
64. See supra Chart 1 (showing that Arkansas, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Utah adopted lethal injection in 1983).
65. By the end of 1983, thirty-eight states had the death penalty. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1983, at 6–7 (1986).
66. See supra Chart 1 (showing that a series of states adopted lethal injection between 1994 and
2002, starting with Kansas, Maryland, Virginia in 1994; Connecticut, Indiana, New York, and South
Carolina in 1995; Kentucky and Tennessee in 1998; Florida and Georgia in 2000; and Alabama in
2002).
67. In 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court held electrocution to be unconstitutional. State v. Mata,
745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008). A year later, the Nebraska legislature adopted lethal injection.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (2010).
68. See supra Chart 1.
69. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 40–63 (2008) (plurality opinion).
70. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (Supp. 2013); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1202 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 2012); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-38 (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2716 (Supp. 2013); IND. CODE § 35-38-6-1 (2012); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-4001 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:569 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51 (West
2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 176.355 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-187 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2949.22 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014 (West Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 137.473 (2013); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-32
(Supp. 2013); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14 (West Supp. 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904
(2013). The New York Court of Appeals held the state’s death-penalty statute unconstitutional in 2004,
preventing executions. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367 (N.Y. 2004). However, the chosen
method of execution in New York remains lethal injection. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 658 (McKinney Supp.
2013).
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lethal injection as their sole execution method but have done so with provisions
that are not retroactive.71 Lethal injection is one of two possible methods of
execution in eleven states, including Utah (which allows some inmates the
choice of firing squad) as well as Kentucky and Tennessee (which allow some
inmates the choice of electrocution).72 A growing number of states, eighteen in
total, no longer have the death penalty, a figure that includes New Mexico,
New Jersey, and Maryland, the most recent state to join this list.73
71. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220 (West Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114 (2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (LexisNexis 2012).
72. These eleven states are divided according to the alternative execution method they allow apart
from lethal injection. Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia allow for electrocution. See ALA.
CODE § 15-18-82.1 (LexisNexis 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105 (West Supp. 2014); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-3-530 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (2013). New Hampshire and Washington also have
hanging as a method. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180
(West 2012). California and Missouri both have lethal gas as an alternative. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3604 (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 546.720 (Supp. 2012). This footnote does not include statutes
designating a choice only if an inmate was sentenced before a certain date or any of the other myriad
variations in statutes that have been documented in detail elsewhere. See Denno, When Legislatures
Delegate, supra note 1, at 188–206.
73. The statutes for these eighteen states are listed in chronological order as follows beginning with
the first state without the death penalty: Act of May 18, 1846, ch. 153, sec. 1, 1846 Mich. Pub. Acts 658
(fixing the punishment for first-degree murder at “solitary confinement at hard labor in the state prison
Chart 2
Execution Methods by State: 2014*
Single-Method States (24)
Arizona ● Arkansas ● Colorado ● Delaware ● Georgia ● Idaho ● Indiana ● Kansas ●
Kentucky ● Louisiana ● Mississippi ● Montana ● Nebraska ● Nevada ●
North Carolina ● Ohio ● Oklahoma ● Oregon ● Pennsylvania ● South Dakota ●
Tennessee ● Texas ● Utah ● Wyoming
Choice States (11)
Lethal Injection or Hanging (2): New Hampshire ● Washington
Lethal Injection or Firing Squad (1): Utah
Lethal Injection or Electrocution (6): Alabama ● Florida ● Kentucky ●
South Carolina ● Tennessee ● Virginia
Lethal Injection or Lethal Gas (2): California ● Missouri
States Without the Death Penalty (18)
Alaska ● Connecticut ● Hawaii ● Illinois ● Iowa ● Maine ● Maryland ●
Massachusetts ● Michigan ● Minnesota ● New Jersey ● New Mexico ● New York ●
North Dakota ● Rhode Island ● Vermont ● West Virginia ● Wisconsin
Also—District of Columbia
* Kentucky, Tennessee, and Utah have provisions that are not retroactive and therefore allow choices for
some inmates. These three states are listed in both the Single-Method States and Choice States categories.
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Statistics demonstrating lethal injection’s dominance, however, ignore the
effect that lethal injection challenges can have on capital punishment. Indeed, it
was the dominance of lethal injection that imperiled all capital punishment
when lethal injection faced legal challenges. The events leading up to Baze
illustrated this effect. In 2006, for example, executions plunged to about half
their 1999 numbers, a trend that continued in 2007 and 2008.74 Numerous states
and the federal government ceased executions entirely, often at least partly due
to problems and legal challenges related to lethal injection.75 Beginning on
for life”); Act of July 12, 1853, ch. 103, 1853 Wis. Sess. Laws 100; Act of Mar. 17, 1887, ch. 133, 1887
Me. Laws 104; Act of Apr. 22, 1911, ch. 387, 1911 Minn. Laws 572 (revising Minnesota’s sentence for
first-degree murder to “imprisonment for life”); Act of June 4, 1957, No. 282, 1957 Haw. Sess. Laws
314 (changing Hawaii’s sentence for first- and second-degree murder to “imprisonment at hard labor”
and repealing the law permitting capital punishment); Act of Mar. 30, 1957, ch. 132, 1957 Alaska Sess.
Laws 262 (abolishing the death penalty “as punishment in Alaska for the commission of any crime,”
prior to Alaska gaining statehood); Act of Apr. 15, 1965, No. 30, 1965 Vt. Acts & Resolves 28 (codified
as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303 (2009)); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-2 (LexisNexis 2013)
(abolishing capital punishment in West Virginia); Act of May 14, 1965, ch. 436, sec. 3, 1965 Iowa Acts
828; Criminal Law Revision Act, ch. 116, §§ 31, 41, 1973 N.D. Laws 215, 286–88, 300 (repealing
North Dakota’s capital-punishment statute and creating new criminal sentencing guidelines); Act of
Dec. 26, 1980, No. 3-307, 27 D.C. Reg. 5624 (repealing the death penalty and substituting it with life
imprisonment instead); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 129 (Mass. 1984) (holding that
Massachusetts’s death-penalty statute violated the state constitution); Act of July 1, 1984, ch. 221,
sec. 1, 1984 R.I. Pub. Laws 523 (removing the punishment of death from sentencing provisions for
first-degree murder); People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367 (N.Y. 2004) (holding the death-penalty
statute in violation of the state constitution); People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 983–84 (N.Y. 2007)
(applying the holding in LaValle to the last remaining person on death row in the state); Act of Dec. 17,
2007, ch. 204, 2007 N.J. Laws 1427 (eliminating the death penalty in New Jersey and allowing for life
imprisonment without eligibility for parole); Act of Mar. 18, 2009, ch. 11, 2009 N.M. Laws 133
(abolishing the death penalty in New Mexico and providing for life imprisonment without possibility of
release or parole); Act of Mar. 9, 2011, No. 96-1543, 2011 Ill. Laws 7778 (creating a death-penalty-
abolition fund and abolishing the death penalty in Illinois); Act of Apr. 25, 2012, No. 12-5, 2012 Conn.
Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.) (providing for a definite sentence of imprisonment for capital felonies); Act of
May 2, 2013, ch. 156, 2013 Md. Laws 2298 (repealing the death penalty and substituting it with life
without the possibility of parole). Notably, the abolishment of the death penalty was retroactive in every
state except for New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland, therefore leaving several people on each of
the three states’ death rows. See 2009 N.M. Laws 133; 2012 Conn. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.); 2013 Md.
Laws 2298.
74. See Executions by Year Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions-year (last updated May 6, 2014).
75. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2013: YEAR END REPORT 2–4 (2013),
available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/YearEnd2013.pdf (discussing the significant decline
in executions in 2013 due to states either suspending executions or repealing capital punishment
because of problems such as drug availability and constitutional challenges to their protocols); Manny
Fernandez, Executions Stall as States Seek Different Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2013, at A1 (reporting
on the inability of several states to perform executions because of the unavailability of lethal injection
drugs and noting that Texas, Florida, and Ohio have been scrambling to find alternative drugs); Clare
Algar, Big Pharma May Help End the Death Penalty, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/115284/big-pharma-may-end-death-penalty (“Shortages of lethal injection drugs
and attendant litigation have resulted in moratoria—an official halting of executions—in Arkansas,
California, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, and
Tennessee.”); Dustin Volz, Death Penalty Opponents Are Winning . . . Almost Everywhere, NAT’L J.
(Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/technology/death-penalty-opponents-are-winning-
almost-everywhere-20131219 (“The [Death Penalty Information Center’s] end-year report cites an
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September 26, 2007, the day the Court granted certiorari in Baze, no additional
executions were conducted until May 6, 2008.76 Although the Court did not
declare a general moratorium on executions during this seven-month period, a
de facto moratorium evolved when the Court granted stays of execution for
individual cases that came before it.77 Historically, such a lengthy hiatus is
rare.78 After Baze was decided, those stays ended when the Justices denied the
underlying appeals. Executions began again, but so did lethal injection litiga-
tion, and with a vengeance.
When the Supreme Court affirmed Kentucky’s three-drug protocol in Baze,
some commentators predicted that there would be a surge of executions because
the de facto moratorium had created a backlog of death-row inmates.79 That
prediction was never realized; apart from a slight rise in 2009, executions have
continued their downward trend.80 The number of executions by year is as
follows: thirty-seven in 2008, fifty-two in 2009, forty-six in 2010, forty-three in
2011, forty-three in 2012, and thirty-nine in 2013.81 One reason for this decline
may be that the death penalty’s popularity has weakened in recent years.82
Whether because of discoveries of innocence among death-row inmates, a
reduction in the number of individuals eligible for execution, racial disparities,
botched executions, or other reasons, the courts and the public have shown
more skepticism of the capital punishment process in the twenty-first century
than they have since the early 1970s.83 Yet, lethal injection challenges may have
contributed to this skepticism. According to one death-penalty commentator,
lethal injection challenges “have already held up more executions, and for a
ongoing shortage of lethal-injection drugs in several states for 2013’s drop in executions. California,
North Carolina, Arkansas, and Maryland have not required a death sentence in more than seven years
‘because of their inability to settle on a lethal-injection protocol.’” (quoting DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
supra, at 4)).
76. See Shaila Dewan, Executions Resume, as Do Questions of Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/07/us/07execute.html (noting that an execution on May 6, 2008
“ended a seven-month national suspension”).
77. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/washington/17scotus.html.
78. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
79. See Liptak, supra note 13.
80. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2012: YEAR END REPORT 1 (2012),
available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2012YearEnd.pdf (noting that the number of new
death sentences in 2012 was the second lowest since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976,
representing a near 75% decline since 1996 when there were 315 new death sentences).
81. See Executions by Year Since 1976, supra note 74.
82. A 2012 Gallup poll measured Americans’ abstract support for the death penalty at 63%, the
second-lowest level of support for capital punishment since 1978 and a significant decline from 1994,
when 80% of respondents were in favor of the death penalty. Likewise, in 2011, Gallup found 61% in
support of the death penalty, the lowest level in 40 years. Lydia Saad, U.S. Death Penalty Support
Stable at 63%, GALLUP (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159770/death-penalty-support-stable.
aspx?utm_sourcealert&utm_mediumemail&utm_campaignsyndication&utm_contentmorelink
&utm_termAll%20Gallup%20Headlines%20-%20Politics.
83. See Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment, in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2013, at 305,
305–24, 328–38, 343–45 (Myrna S. Raeder ed., 2013).
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longer time than appeals involving such . . . issues as race, innocence, and
mental competency.”84
II. BAZE AS PRECEDENT
Given the narrowness and ineffectiveness of the Baze opinion, the Court’s
decision has had minimal effect in the way that the Baze plurality intended.85
Rather than offering guidance on the future direction of lethal injection, the
legal issues and procedures evaluated by the Baze Court have been overshad-
owed by far more pragmatic threats to the continuation of executions by lethal
injection. Considered together with the ongoing mass of lethal injection chal-
lenges and protocol changes that have ensued since 2008, it can be argued that
Baze has rendered itself moot.86 Strikingly, even Kentucky itself—the “model”
state at the heart of Baze—has switched to a single-drug protocol, such that it is
no longer “substantially similar” to the procedure the Baze Court hailed as the
standard for other states to follow.87
Yet this is a remarkable conclusion to reach regarding a Supreme Court
opinion merely six years after its issuance, particularly in a case that marks the
Court’s first foray into the constitutionality of an execution method in over six
decades.88 I base this assertion on two grounds. First, although Baze has not
been entirely void of precedential force, my analysis of all cases that have cited
Baze, which I discuss in section II.A, indicates that the case’s value as precedent
has been limited. My study demonstrates that number of citations is not always
indicative of an opinion’s efficacy. Second, citations to Baze have decreased
substantially in the last three years.89 As I explain in section II.B, this decline is
most likely because the nature of lethal injection challenges now bear on issues
that have only remote or nonexistent parallels to those that prompted Baze in the
first place.90 In addition, recent developments have shown that some of the
purposes for which Baze may have been used in the past are no longer viable,
84. Dieter, supra note 2, at 789.
85. See id. at 806.
86. See infra section II.B.
87. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding Kentucky’s three-drug
protocol).
88. This six-decade demarcation was offered by the Court. See id. at 48–50 (plurality opinion)
(discussing the Eighth Amendment precedents of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)). There
is room for disagreement, however, on when the Court last reviewed evidence concerning the
constitutionality of an execution method given that the cases the Court cites were decided before the
Eighth Amendment’s incorporation into the Due Process Clause. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra
note 1, at 321–34.
89. The distributions by year are as follows: fifty-three cases in 2008; seventy-five cases in 2009;
eighty-one cases in 2010; sixty-three cases in 2011; fifty-three cases in 2012; twelve cases in 2013 (as
of May 13, 2013). Deborah W. Denno, Analyzing Precedent in Baze v. Rees: 2008–2013, at 5 (Aug. 1,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
90. See infra section II.B.
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the use of foreign-sourced drugs being a particularly striking example.91 Indeed,
lethal injection litigation after Baze is so prolific and variable that it seemingly
dwarfs the extent to which Baze has been used to dismiss challenges. I conclude
that Baze’s already constrained precedential force is barely applicable to recent
litigation spurred by this country’s unanticipated drug shortages.
A. BAZE’S LIMITED PRECEDENTIAL FORCE
Three hundred thirty-three cases have cited the Baze Court’s plurality opinion
(as well as the concurrences and dissent) from the time Baze was decided until
May 30, 2013.92 I reviewed the nature of each case’s citation and reference to
Baze and then grouped the cases along several dimensions into one or more of
the following categories: the substantial-risk standard; concurring and dis-
senting opinions; and the Eighth Amendment standard.93 In the next three
subsections, I will discuss each group in turn.
91. For more information on the use of foreign-sourced drugs, see infra Part III.
92. A total of 406 cases cited Baze; however, 73 cases were lower-court decisions that eventually
evolved into the appellate-court decisions that this Article analyzes. See Denno, supra note 89, at 3–4.
Thus, the final 333 cases are not redundant. Id. All 406 cases, however, are categorized and documented
in detail in a manuscript on file with the author. Id. at tbl.A.
93. See Denno, supra note 89, at 5–23. In total, fourteen cases were not included in this analysis
because their use of Baze was not directly relevant. For example, six of these cases cited Baze for the
purpose of declaring that states are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
See, e.g., Bethea v. Salazar, No. EDCV 05-1168 DOC (FFM), 2008 WL 4381545, at *13 n.24 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 23, 2008) (citing Baze stating that the Eighth Amendment provides that excessive bail shall
not be required, and excessive fines shall not be imposed); State v. Cottrell, 271 P.3d 1243, 1250 n.4
(Idaho Ct. App. 2012) (citing Baze explaining that states are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause
because the whole of the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states). Eight cases cited Baze in ways
that do not coincide with the three categories. Most of these cases mentioned Baze in a footnote or in
combination with other cases to reinforce a briefly mentioned point. See Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917,
925 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that the Supreme Court in Baze “observed that the purpose of the habeas
statute of limitations is to end delays in criminal cases”); Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 416 (5th Cir.
2008) (stating that Baze has permitted inmates to challenge the state’s method of execution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and a constitutional standard); Schwab v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 284 F. App’x 643, 644
(11th Cir. 2008) (stating that the plaintiff “has abandoned the argument he made in the district court that
it had misinterpreted its November 14, 2007 order providing that unless Schwab filed a motion to
re-open the case within 30 days after a final decision in Baze v. Rees, his case would be dismissed”
(citation omitted)); Karban v. Ryan, No. CV 10-0406-TUC-DCB, 2011 WL 320559, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 27, 2011) (using Baze as a citation for the statement: “[S]peculation cannot substitute for evidence
of irreparable harm” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barrett v. United
States, No. 09-CIV-105-JHP, 2010 WL 774192, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2010) (stating that “[w]hile
the Court understands that ‘death is different,’ the issues in this particular case are not significantly
more complex than any other criminal case tried in this district” (footnote omitted) (quoting Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring))); Wilson v. Strickland, No. 2:09-cv-271, 2009
WL 1362511, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 2009) (stating that “Baze did not establish a new claim or
constitutional right but simply made clear the expansive scope of the claim and right involved”); State
v. Jackson, No. 92003717DI, 2008 WL 5048424, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) (“A trial in the
District Court litigation was then postponed pending a decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Baze v. Rees.”); State v. Hartman, No. 25055, 2010 WL 4867370, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2010)
(stating that in Baze, “the United States Supreme Court recognized a condemned prisoner’s right to
challenge the method of execution and adopted the appropriate standard to be applied in considering
that challenge”).
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1. Substantial-Risk Standard
The substantial-risk standard in Baze was the most encompassing category in
my study. Although Baze alludes to a number of risk standards,94 the cases in
this study tended to favor a particularly high hurdle for the petitioner: in order
to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, a risk must be “‘sure or very
likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘suffi-
ciently imminent dangers.’”95 Altogether, 248 cases cited this standard in re-
sponse to four potential Eighth Amendment challenges related to state protocols:
(1) execution team training, (2) drug type and protocol procedure, (3) use of
foreign-sourced drugs, or (4) failure to protect inmates from alleged violent and
assaultive prison conditions.96
a. Execution Team Training. Twenty-nine cases cited Baze in discussions of
execution-team or supervisor training levels and protocols and reached varying
results.97 All cases, with the exception of one that was remanded,98 relied on
Baze to question evidence of improper training. As noted in one representative
case, any risk of mistake on the execution team’s part connected to the team’s
lack of practice using a certain drug “is speculative and fails to rise to the level
required to demonstrate a substantial risk of serious harm under Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.”99
b. Drug Type and Protocol Implementation. Most cases (216 cases or 87%)
cited Baze’s substantial-risk standard to refute challenges concerning a proto-
col’s use of particular lethal injection drugs or procedures.100 Many of the cases
94. Baze, 553 U.S. at 47–50 (plurality opinion). For a discussion and criticism of these standards,
see Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV.
11, 14–16, 39–40 (2009); Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment,
Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 9–10, 24–25 (2010);
Deborah W. Denno, When Willie Francis Died: The “Disturbing” Story Behind One of the Eighth
Amendment’s Most Enduring Standards of Risk, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 17, 89–93 (John H. Blume &
Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009); Nadia N. Sawicki, “There Must Be a Means”—The Backward Jurispru-
dence of Baze v. Rees, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1407, 1409–14 (2010); Denno, supra note 18, at 196–201.
95. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34–35 (1993)).
96. See Denno, supra note 89, at tbl.B.
97. Id. at 13–14.
98. See Morales v. Cate, 757 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that a prior California
case found “that the execution team improperly mixed, prepared, and administered sodium thiopental
during executions; that members of California’s execution team were insufficiently qualified; that the
IV team members were ‘not adequately prepared to deal with any complications that may arise’; that
the walk-throughs in which the execution team participated were incomplete, and the team did not
receive meaningful training” (citations omitted) (quoting Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972,
979–80 (N.D. Cal. 2006))).
99. Beaty v. Brewer, 791 F. Supp. 2d 678, 684–85 (D. Ariz. 2011); see also Campbell v. Wood, 18
F.3d 662, 687 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The risk of accident cannot and need not be eliminated from the
execution process in order to survive constitutional review.”).
100. See Denno, supra note 89, at 10.
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argued that the protocol’s implementation violates the Eighth Amendment,101
whereas others involved challenges to the type of drug being injected, such as
the choice of pentobarbital in place of sodium thiopental, which was needed to
rectify the issues presented by a shortage of the latter.102 Almost every court
relied on the Baze substantial-risk standard to establish that the method of
injection and the drugs administered did not pose a risk sufficient to constitute
an Eighth Amendment violation.103
A breakdown of these cases provides more specific insight into the kinds of
issues addressed. For example, 195 of the 216 cases concern challenges to a
state protocol’s method or procedure.104 These cases include challenges to the
type of method used—a one-drug105 or three-drug106 method—and the state
protocol’s lethal injection procedure in general.107 As stated above, each court
presented with a protocol challenge found that the plaintiffs in question could
not establish that the protocol created a demonstrated risk of severe pain, as
explicated in Baze, or that the risk was substantial compared to other known
101. See Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Simply because an execution
method may result in pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not
establish the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that qualifies as cruel and unusual.” (quoting
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d
808, 873 (Miss. 2013) (finding that Mississippi’s protocol was “substantially similar to Kentucky’s
protocol” and thus that an Eighth Amendment challenge was unfounded (quoting Chamberlin v. State,
55 So. 3d 1046, 1056 (Miss. 2010))).
102. See Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding a district court’s
finding that the state’s use of pentobarbital in a lethal injection protocol fell short of the level of risk
that was needed to establish an Eighth Amendment claim); see also Jackson, 656 F.3d at 160
(“Delaware, along with a number of other states, revised its protocol to allow for the use of an
alternative barbiturate, pentobarbital, as the first chemical to be administered.”); Lucas v. Upton,
No. 5:09-CV-289 (CAR), 2011 WL 4526754, at *4 n.3 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2011) (“Since confiscation
of its supply of sodium thiopental, Georgia, as well as several other states, has started to use
pentobarbital as the first drug in the three-step lethal injection process.”); State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d
566, 698 (Conn. 2012) (noting that “in light of recent developments that have seriously restricted the
availability of sodium thiopental for use in executions, those death penalty jurisdictions that more
actively implement death sentences have turned to pentobarbital as a substitute drug”); State v. Rizzo,
31 A.3d 1094, 1169 (Conn. 2011) (noting the shortage of thiopental sodium generally).
103. See Denno, supra note 89, at 11.
104. See id. at tbl.B.
105. See Pardo v. Palmer, 500 F. App’x 901, 902–05 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding a one-drug lethal
injection protocol); Cooey v. Strickland, 589 F.3d 210, 223–25 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the risk of
improper implementation of Ohio’s one-drug protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
106. See Peterson v. State, 2 So. 3d 146, 156–57 (Fla. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff’s argument
“that Florida’s lethal injection process is unconstitutional because it employs a three-drug protocol that
may cause undue pain” does not qualify as a substantial risk); Thomas v. State, No. W2008-01941-CCA-
R3-PD, 2011 WL 675936, at *46–47 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2011) (upholding a three-drug lethal
injection protocol).
107. See Grant v. Workman, No. 05-CV-0167-TCK-TLW, 2010 WL 5069853, at *39 (N.D. Okla.
Dec. 2, 2010) (ruling against the plaintiff’s argument that the state’s lethal injection protocol violates
the Eighth Amendment because it creates a substantial risk of the inmate suffering intense pain due to
the fact that “there is no assurance that Oklahoma’s procedure will render him unconscious during the
execution”); State v. Odom, No. W2008-02464-CCA-R3-DD, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 223, at
*103–07 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2010) (ruling against the plaintiff’s argument that the state’s written
protocol lacks safeguards and other written provisions and is thus unconstitutional).
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methods.108 In coming to this conclusion, many courts compared the challenged
state protocol to Kentucky’s protocol and found the two protocols to be “substan-
tially similar,” and thus, the challenged protocol constitutional.109
Additionally, 27 of the 216 cases dealt with challenges to the drug being used
for the procedure,110 with 19 specific challenges to the use of pentobarbital as a
replacement for sodium thiopental in a state’s one-drug or three-drug method.111
Despite the drug’s limited testing and use in lethal injection procedures, courts
consistently upheld the implementation of pentobarbital and found that its
substitution for sodium thiopental did not create a substantial risk of harm to the
inmate.112
c. Foreign-Sourced Drugs. With the increasing scarcity of lethal injection
drugs in this country, especially sodium thiopental, departments of corrections
started purchasing drugs from other countries.113 Some drug-protocol chal-
lenges attacked the use of foreign-sourced drugs, and thirteen cases cite Baze
for support.114 Strikingly, almost every court presented with a foreign-drug
challenge found that the plaintiff did not have sufficient evidence to show that
the use of a foreign-produced drug would be likely to create a substantial risk of
108. See Harbison v. Little, 571 F.3d 531, 535–39 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the inmate failed to
show that the protocol retained an inherent risk of severe pain, which was substantial compared to the
alternatives).
109. See, e.g., Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 873 (Miss. 2013); see also Jackson v. Danberg,
656 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that the state’s lethal injection
protocol was constitutional because it was found to be “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s protocol);
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “Virginia’s protocol is
substantially similar to Kentucky’s protocol” and that the plaintiff “failed as a matter of law to
demonstrate a substantial or objectively intolerable risk that he will receive an inadequate dose of
thiopental”); Brown v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:01-cv-2374-T-23TGW, 2009 WL 4349320, at *21
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009) (adopting “a trial court’s analysis concluding that Florida’s lethal-injection
protocol is ‘substantially similar’ to that of Kentucky” (quoting Schwab v. State, 995 So. 2d 922,
924–33 (Fla. 2008))).
110. See, e.g., Brewer v. Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. 445, 445 (2010) (ruling against a plaintiff who
challenged the use of potentially non-FDA approved sodium thiopental); Kerr v. Thaler, 384 F. App’x
400, 405 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Baze in holding that the use of pancuronium bromide in a three-drug
injection method was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
111. See Denno, supra note 89, at tbl.B.
112. See Jackson, 656 F.3d at 164 (noting that “each court to consider this issue has uniformly
held that the use of pentobarbital in lieu of sodium thiopental is constitutional”); Creech v. Reinke,
No. 1:12-cv-00173-EJL, 2012 WL 1995085, at *16–24 (D. Idaho June 4, 2012) (upholding a one-drug
lethal injection protocol using pentobarbital); Beaty v. Brewer, 791 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681–86 (D. Ariz.
2011) (holding that the inmate failed to establish a likelihood of success in his claim that the state’s
last-minute substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental violated the Eighth Amendment); Valle
v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 538–53 (Fla. 2011) (upholding the use of pentobarbital in the state’s three-drug
lethal injection method); see also DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
that use of pentobarbital does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Powell v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255,
1257–58 (11th Cir. 2011) (approving the substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental).
113. See infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
114. See Denno, supra note 89, at 8.
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unconstitutional harm.115 By July 23, 2013, such determinations would no
longer be viable. On that date, the D.C. Circuit held that the FDA violated the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Administrative Procedure Act by allow-
ing the importation of unapproved or misbranded sodium thiopental for use in
lethal injection procedures.116
d. Failure to Protect. Not surprisingly, courts have relied on Baze for chal-
lenges apart from problems associated with lethal injection. Altogether, thirty-
three cases cited Baze in the context of “failure to protect” claims under the
Eighth Amendment, most typically raised against a prison official for failing to
protect an inmate from harm or for a violation of a duty to protect from future
harm.117 Baze was most often cited to affirm that in order to establish such a
claim, the plaintiff must “allege facts from which a court could conclude that he
faces a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants knew of and
disregarded that risk.”118 The finding in Baze that an “isolated mishap” or “an
accident, with no suggestion of malevolence,”119 would not give rise to an
Eighth Amendment violation is often used to support the rejection of the failure
to protect claims brought about in these cases.120 Most of the failure to protect
cases are in reference to prison violence, assault, or abuse; however, some cases
discuss different settings in which a substantial risk first must be established.121
Although such a use of Baze is unsurprising given the dearth of Eighth
Amendment precedent, it seems a stretch in light of more relevant doctrine
specifically dealing with prison violence in a way Baze does not.122
115. See Towery v. Brewer, No. CV-12-245-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 592749, at *15 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23,
2012) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that use of foreign-obtained pancuronium bromide will subject
them to a risk of pain and suffering because foreign-sourced drugs do not have FDA approval); Valle,
70 So. 3d at 546 (finding that the use of a potentially FDA-unapproved drug did not show that the
modified procedure was “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering or . . . result
in a substantial risk of serious harm”).
116. See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (affirming the judgment from Beaty v. FDA,
853 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012), which permanently enjoined the FDA from allowing the importation
of apparently misbranded or unapproved sodium thiopental based on the finding that the use of such
drugs creates an unnecessary risk of improper anesthetization).
117. See Denno, supra note 89, at tbl.A.
118. Wilson v. Ryker, 451 F. App’x 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011).
119. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459, 463 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. See, e.g., Porter v. Cash, No. CV 11-10308-DMG (AGR), 2012 WL 5308369, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2012); Mitchell v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. CV 09-5531-SJO (AGR), 2011 WL 4801890,
at *5 (C.D. Cal June 13, 2011); Wallace v. Moberg, No. CV 07-6-VAP (AGR), 2009 WL 91079, at *8
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2009).
121. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252–61 (3d Cir. 2010) (presenting a
case in which a delinquent juvenile brings an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect challenge against a
youth development center for a spinal injury that occurred during a “pick-up” football game at the
center).
122. Prison-condition and violence cases have, in the past, been justifications for dismissing
execution-methods claims. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 1, at 327–48.
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2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Over one-fifth of the 333 cases cited opinions other than the Baze plurality.123
These seventy-two cases primarily included references to Justice Thomas’s and
Justice Stevens’s concurrences as well as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, nearly in
equal number.124 In total, thirty-four cases cited to Justice Thomas’s concur-
rence,125 which argued that inmates should be required to show that a lethal
injection protocol is “deliberately designed to inflict pain” to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation.126 These cases concluded that if there was sufficient
evidence to uphold a lethal injection procedure under the Eighth Amendment
standard set by the Baze plurality, there was also sufficient evidence to uphold
the procedure under Justice Thomas’s more rigorous intent-based standard.127 A
disproportionate number of these cases (sixteen in total) originated in Florida
and frequently cited the following quote from the Florida Supreme Court:128
“Florida’s current lethal-injection protocol passes muster under any of the
risk-based standards considered by the Baze Court (and would also easily
satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia).”129
Although seemingly dicta, the repeated use of this particular quote by the
Florida Supreme Court in its holdings was noticeable and unique among those
courts approving lethal injection protocols.
In turn, a comparable number of cases (thirty-three in total) cited Justice
Stevens’s concurrence,130 a particularly noteworthy opinion because it was the
first time he voiced his general opposition to the death penalty.131 Justice
Stevens explained that he concurred in Baze because he felt obligated under the
Court’s precedents; however, like Justices before him, he had gradually changed
his mind about the death penalty for a range of reasons that he articulated in
great detail.132 In my study, some cases cited Justice Stevens’s commentary
123. See Denno, supra note 89, at 18.
124. See id. at tbl.A.
125. See id.
126. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring).
127. See Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Brown v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., No. 8:01-cv-2374-T-23TGW, 2009 WL 4349320, at *20 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (explaining that
Justice Thomas “renounced any risk-based standard in favor of a rule of law that would uphold any
method of execution which does not involve the purposeful infliction of ‘pain and suffering beyond that
necessary to cause death’” (emphasis added) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 96 (Thomas, J., concurring))).
128. See Denno, supra note 89, at 18.
129. Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla. 2009) (discussing the variety of opinions in Baze and
noting that it believes Florida’s protocol would meet all the risk-based standards mentioned by the Baze
Court).
130. See Denno, supra note 89, at tbl.A.
131. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 78–86 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132. For example, Justice Stevens observed the problems with the way capital punishment is
actually implemented and the paradoxical result that “more recent cases have endorsed procedures that
provide less protections to capital defendants than to ordinary offenders.” Id. at 84. In his eyes, capital
punishment is the “product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process that
weighs the costs and risks of administering that penalty against its identifiable benefits.” Id. at 78.
Therefore, the punishment “represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal
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regarding the risk of error in capital cases,133 whereas other cases cited his
reservations regarding the value of the death penalty.134
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which Justice Souter joined, focused more nar-
rowly on the perils of lethal injection, emphasizing that a number of other states
had instituted far more adequate procedures than Kentucky to ensure that an
inmate is anesthetized before execution.135 “[I]f readily available measures can
materially increase the likelihood that the protocol will cause no pain, a State
fails to adhere to contemporary standards of decency if it declines to employ
those measures.”136 The thirty-six cases in my study that cited to Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent stressed the safeguards that states had implemented in their
lethal injection protocols.137 The majority of states went even further, compar-
ing a specific state’s lethal injection safeguards to Kentucky’s lack of safeguards
as a way to further affirm the constitutionality of the specific state’s lethal
injection protocol.138
3. Eighth Amendment Standard
Altogether, fifty-four cases cited Baze in reference to the Eighth Amend-
ment or to affirm the constitutionality of lethal injection by the Court’s holding
that injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.139 Some cases,
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.’” Id. at 86 (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
133. See In re Noling, 651 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2011) (“In Baze v. Rees, Justice Stevens brings to
mind the fact that many innocent people are convicted of crimes they did not commit before being
vindicated by the timely revelation of exculpatory facts. Some of those people are capital defendants.”
(citation omitted)); People v. Runge, 917 N.E.2d 940, 998 (Ill. 2009) (Burke, J., dissenting) (noting that
the “risk of error in capital cases may be greater than in other cases because the facts are often so
disturbing” (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
134. See Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that “the imposition of the
death penalty represents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to
any discernible social or public purposes” (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring))
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Brown v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:01-cv-2374-T-23TGW, 2009
WL 4349320, at *20 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Justice Stevens’s “general disagreement with . . . the
death penalty”).
135. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 119–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 117.
137. See Denno, supra note 89, at tbl.A.
138. See Henyard v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 543 F.3d 644, 648 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing to the finding
by Justice Ginsberg that revisions to Florida’s lethal injection protocols provide additional safeguards in
comparison to Kentucky’s protocols); Chester v. Wetzel, No. 1:08-cv-1261, 2012 WL 5439054, at *11
(M.D. Penn. Nov. 6, 2012) (“Justice Ginsburg noted that Kentucky’s protocol did not require anyone to
call the inmate’s name, shake the inmate, brush his eyelashes, or apply noxious stimulus to gauge his
response. . . . [S]uch a consciousness check could be easily implemented and could reduce the risk of
dreadful pain.”).
139. See Denno, supra note 89, at tbl.A; see, e.g., Hartman v. Bobby, 319 F. App’x. 370, 372 n.1
(6th Cir. 2009) (stating that the court “cannot authorize a successive petition or grant a stay on this
ground, because the Supreme Court’s decision in Baze did not create a new constitutional right that
applies retroactively”); Alba v. Quarterman, 621 F. Supp. 2d 396, 432 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Baze to
state that lethal injection is a constitutionally permissible form of execution); Fields v. Commonwealth,
274 S.W.3d 375, 420 (Ky. 2008) (citing Baze to support the statement that “[l]ethal injection is not cruel
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for example, referenced the Baze plurality’s characterization of the Eighth
Amendment merely to affirm that citizens are privy to the rights listed within
the Amendment.140 Other cases focused more specifically on lethal injection.
Broom v. Strickland, for instance, cited the Baze Court’s determination that
Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol is constitutional in order to compare a
situation in which a lethal injection attempt may be considered unconstitu-
tional.141
B. POST-BAZE LITIGATION AND RISK
On June 10, 2008, less than two months after Baze was decided, an Ohio state
court ruled in State v. Rivera that Ohio could no longer employ the standard
three-drug protocol (used in Kentucky) for executing inmates because the drug
combination contravened Ohio’s own lethal injection statute and therefore
violated due process.142 In making this determination, the court heard testimony
from two of the key medical experts who also testified for the defense and the
state respectively in Baze.143 Yet the Rivera court reached different conclusions
from Baze, holding specifically that “the use of two drugs in the lethal injection
protocol (pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride) creates an unnecessary
and arbitrary risk that the condemned will experience an agonizing and painful
death.”144 This recognition prompted the court to hold that the state’s lethal
injection protocol should use only “a lethal injection of a single, anesthetic
drug.”145
By way of affirming these dangers, the Rivera court listed as a finding of fact
nearly every criticism made of the three-drug combination, ranging from the
difficulties in assessing the condemned person’s depth of anesthesia before
administering the second and third drugs, to the heightened risk from physi-
cians’ refusal to participate in the process, to the number of mistakes made in
the delivery of anesthesia even in a clinical setting.146 The Rivera court also
recognized “[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . that some condemned prisoners have
and unusual punishment”); see also Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 448 (6th Cir. 2009) (Suhrheinrich,
J., concurring); Scott v. Houk, No. 4:07-CV-0753, 2011 WL 5838195, at *45–46 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18,
2011); Riley v. McDaniel, No. 3:01-cv-0096-RCJ-VPC, 2010 WL 3786070, at *59 (D. Nev. Sept. 20,
2010).
140. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Baze in support of
the statement that “the Constitution guarantees an individual a broad range of ‘rights, privileges, and
immunities’ against the United States government, including the right to be free from torture” (quoting
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122–23 (1901))).
141. No. 2:09-cv-823, 2010 WL 3447741, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2010) (stating that “a series of
abortive execution attempts could potentially indeed present an unconstitutional violation”).
142. No. 04CR065940, 2008 WL 2784679, at *1, *9 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008).
143. See id at *1. The two doctors were Mark Heath, M.D., for the defense and Mark Dershwitz,
M.D., for the government. See Susi Vassallo, Thiopental in Lethal Injection, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 957,
958–59 (2008).
144. Rivera, 2008 WL 2784679, at *6.
145. Id at *9.
146. See id at *3–4.
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suffered a painful death, due to a flawed lethal injection.”147
One reason for the seeming divergence of Rivera’s holding from that of Baze
is Ohio’s lethal injection statute. That statute requires “a lethal injection of a
drug or combination of drugs of sufficient dosage to quickly and painlessly
cause death.”148 In contrast, “the Kentucky lethal injection statute has no
mandate that an execution be painless.”149 Therefore, an interpretation of
Kentucky’s statute “is not applicable” in Rivera because unlike Ohio’s statute,
“the [U.S.] Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in
carrying out executions.”150
Rivera was the first case in which a court ordered a state to employ only a
single anesthetic drug, thus reflecting the momentum created by other judges
and commissions that had long criticized the three-drug combination.151 The
Baze Court emphasized the uniqueness of this very situation by noting that the
petitioners’ proposed alternative protocol (the use of a single barbiturate) was
“one that . . . has not been adopted by any State and has never been tried.”152
With Rivera, the “uniqueness” claim from Baze would no longer be accurate.
By breaking away from the three-drug-formula pact, Rivera started to weaken
the safety-in-numbers argument states had embraced in determining that a
shared lethal injection formula provides a humane death.
Like Morales v. Hickman153 and earlier cases,154 Rivera also cut through
much of the paradox in Baze that even the Supreme Court was unable to avoid.
For example, with the single-barbiturate injection, Rivera provided a potential
solution to the absence of a medical professional in the execution chamber
because a one-drug formula was considered so much easier to administer.155
This solution was aided by the Rivera court’s focus on the constitutional
147. Id at *4.
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.22(A) (LexisNexis 2006). The Rivera court emphasized that the
statute’s purpose “is to provide the condemned person with an execution that is ‘quick’ and ‘painless;’
and the legislature’s use of the word, ‘shall,’ when qualifying the state’s duty to provide a quick and
painless death signifies that the duty is mandatory.” Rivera, 2008 WL 2784679, at *5. Because “the
duty of the state to the individual is mandatory, a property interest is created in the benefit”; the statute
confers on the condemned person a property interest in a painless death. Id. For the state to then execute
the condemned person in a manner that carries an “unnecessary risk of pain, and, as well, any
unnecessary expectation by the condemned person that his execution may be agonizing, or excruciat-
ingly painful,” id. at *7, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
at *8. As a result, the Rivera court held that “the words, ‘or combination of drugs,’ may be severed”
from the Ohio statute in light of the court’s ruling that only one anesthetic drug be employed. Id. at *9.
149. Rivera, 2008 WL 2784679, at *7 (alteration in original).
150. Id. at *9 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (plurality opinion)).
151. See Adam Liptak & Adam B. Ellick, Judge Orders Ohio to Alter Its Method of Execution,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/us/11death.html.
152. Baze, 553 U.S. at 41 (plurality opinion).
153. 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006).
154. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 102–17.
155. See Death Penalty: States Transition to One-Drug Executions, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 19,
2012, 6:56 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/07/death-penalty-states-transition-to-one-
drug-executions.html.
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viability of the execution method itself and not on the larger topic of the death
penalty generally. After all, medical professionals have recommended abolition
as a solution for avoiding the potential hazard of physician involvement in
executions.156 Without the distraction of having to grapple with death-penalty
debates more broadly, the Rivera court was better able to evaluate different
types of lethal injection procedures.
As it would turn out, however, Ohio’s breaking from the pack, even to satisfy
legislative requirements, would garner substantial notice. This switch was a
huge development in the death-penalty world and the first such inroad with
lethal injection, especially coming on the heels of Baze.157 Baze was supposed
to be the Supreme Court’s effort to end the lethal injection story, not push it full
throttle.
The next chapter after Baze would be even more critical because it would
involve all three administrative layers in the execution process: the legislature,
the courts, and the department of corrections. No matter what lethal injection
statute a legislature has in place or how a court interprets that statute, both
legislatures and courts delegate the actual business of executions to a depart-
ment of corrections.158 Until Ohio’s change to a single-drug protocol, the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (Ohio Facility) in Lucasville held a striking
record of ineptitude in the execution or attempted execution of inmates, the
Romell Broom case being the most egregious example.159
Although the Ohio Facility was stung by its experiences with the three-drug
156. See Atul Gawande, When Law and Ethics Collide—Why Physicians Participate in Executions,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1221, 1229 (2006).
157. See Denno, supra note 18, at 202–04.
158. See generally Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 1 (discussing the extent to which
legislatures delegate the execution process to departments of corrections, which are typically not in a
position to handle such responsibility).
159. See State v. Broom, No. 96747, 2012 WL 504504, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2012). All
executions in Ohio are conducted at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, Ohio. See id.
In 2007, a nearly two-hour execution of an Ohio prisoner who appeared to be suffocated alive followed
a comparably controversial ninety-minute execution a year earlier that had compelled the state to revise
its procedures. See id. at *8. Yet, those revisions did not take hold. On September 15, 2009, Romell
Broom would undergo one of the most egregious efforts by any department of corrections to attempt to
inject an inmate to death, even though he would be the first inmate ever to survive a lethal injection
procedure. See id. at *1, *7. For over two hours, Broom withstood nearly twenty “puncture wounds,” as
the execution team made “numerous, unsuccessful” attempts to search for a viable vein that would not
collapse when drugs were injected. Id. at *1. During this time, the team took breaks, changed execution
strategies, probed different access sites on Broom’s body, as well as garnered the direct assistance of a
staff doctor who was not part of the team. See id. After the first forty-five minutes of the execution
process, for example, the prison director ordered the team to stop so that they could confer about what
to do because nothing was working. See id. Ten-to-twenty minutes later, the team reconvened to try to
establish an intravenous line (IV) in Broom’s biceps, forearms, and hands. When this strategy failed,
they called upon the staff doctor to try something else. That doctor unsuccessfully attempted to insert
the IV catheters on top of Broom’s foot and ankle bone, an excruciating experience for Broom who
claimed that the needle entered his ankle bone. See id. Ultimately, the execution was halted, and Broom
remains alive, awaiting the possibility of a second execution attempt. See Josh Sanburn, Ohio’s Grisly
Execution History, TIME (Jan. 17, 2014), http://nation.time.com/2014/01/17/ohios-grisly-execution-
history/.
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procedure, officials were concerned about implementing a one-drug procedure
that had yet to be used on anyone, anywhere.160 Wanting to ensure that history
did not repeat itself in the upcoming execution of Kenneth Biros, in November
2009, the Ohio Facility issued a two-part lethal injection protocol.161 In the first
part (Plan A), executioners would inject only sodium thiopental. If the execution
team failed at Plan A, Plan B directed the team to inject directly into the
inmate’s arm or leg muscles an overdose of two drugs never before used in any
execution in the world.162
Plan B’s potential problems are vast. According to expert commentary, the
two Plan B drugs, hydromorphone and midazolam, could produce a slow,
lingering death with the inmate in a state of confusion, disorientation, and
intense psychological anguish and torment. The nausea-evoking effect of hydro-
morphone could cause the prisoner to vomit, before or after drifting into
unconsciousness.163 Ohio officials warned journalists witnessing the execution
that Biros could end up vomiting and convulsing if in fact the backup plan
went into effect.164 Although Ohio’s own lethal injection statute requires that
death be quick and painless, expert testimony suggests that Plan B is probably
the slowest lethal injection method yet proposed in the United States.165 Like-
wise, Plan B directly contravenes Ohio’s veterinary euthanasia laws because the
particular drugs and intramuscular method are all prohibited for animals (the
Ohio statute forbids any euthanasia for animals by intravenous drugs other than
pentobarbital).166
Plan B still remains in effect in Ohio. Regardless, Kenneth Biros’s Plan A
execution on December 8, 2009, was fraught with problems. Executioners
required a half-hour and nine unsuccessful attempts to finally find a vein in
which to put an IV catheter.167
Ohio’s move to a single-drug protocol served as an impetus for other states to
also make the switch, irrespective of Ohio’s difficulties with Biros’s execution
and the state’s unique statute. For over a century, states have closely followed
160. See Ariane de Vogue & Dennis Powell, Ohio Killer Executed in First Use of Single-Drug
Lethal Injection, ABC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lethal-injection-ohio-perform-
execution-single-drug/story?id9277599 (describing the use of an untested, single-drug formula).
161. See Cooey v. Strickland, 604 F.3d 939, 942–43 (6th Cir. 2010).
162. See de Vogue & Powell, supra note 160.
163. See Cooey, 604 F.3d at 943.
164. See Deborah W. Denno, Ohio’s Perverse First Place, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborah-w-denno/ohios-perverse-first-plac_b_385808.html; Andrew
Welsh-Huggins, States: Death-Penalty Drug Scramble, Higher Cost, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (July 9,
2011, 2:14 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9OC9L100.htm.
165. See Cooey v. Strickland, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122025, at *225–26 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 7, 2009) (testimony of Mark Heath, M.D.).
166. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.532 (LexisNexis 2013).
167. See Aaron Marshall, Kenneth Biros Becomes First Inmate Executed Using Single-Drug Method,
CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 8, 2009, 6:10 PM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/12/biros_becomes_
first_inmate_exe.html.
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the execution strategies of other states,168 and Ohio’s change would be no
exception. The key switch from the past was the greater rapidity and extent to
168. For detailed examinations of these trends, see generally Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 1;
Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1; Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 1.
Chart 3
Changes in State Lethal Injection Protocols: 2009–2013*
Year
Three Drugs to
One Drug
Sodium Thiopental
to Pentobarbital
Sodium Thiopental
to Propofol
2009 Ohio5
2010 Washington1 Oklahoma
2011 South Dakota1,2,3,7 Alabama
Arizona1,2
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho1
Mississippi
Montana2,4
Ohio5
South Carolina
South Dakota1,2,3,7
Texas
Virginia
2012 Arizona1,2
Georgia
Idaho1
Missouri
Texas
Missouri
2013 Arkansas4,8
Kentucky2,3,4,5
Louisiana6
Kentucky2,3,4,5
Louisiana6
1 Allows for either one or three drugs.
2 Allows either sodium thiopental or
pentobarbital.
3 Allows for either one or two drugs.
4 Executions are on hold due to court challenges.
5 Backup protocol uses two drugs.
6 Execution stayed so judge can evaluate
protocol.
7 Allows for one, two, or three drugs.
8 Considering other drugs.
* Information for this chart reflects trends up to August 1, 2013, and comes from the following sources: State
by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenalty.org/state-lethal-injection
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014); Death Penalty Clinic, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Sch. of Law, Execution Protocol
Information, LETHALINJECTION.ORG, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/dpclinic/LethalInjection/Litigators/li/
protocol.html (last visited Aug 1, 2013).
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which states would follow Ohio’s decision to use only sodium thiopental. As
Charts 3 and 4 of this Article show, eleven states—or over one-third of all the
death-penalty states—have moved from three drugs to one drug in less than five
years (2009–2013).169 Ohio’s decision to move at the end of 2009 would be
quickly followed, respectively, over the next two years by Washington in 2010
and South Dakota in 2011 and then by five states in 2012 (Arizona, Georgia,
169. See supra Charts 3 & 4.
Chart 4
Types of Anesthetic Used in Lethal Injection Protocols: 2013*
1 Allows for either one or three drugs.
2 Allows either sodium thiopental or pentobarbital.
3 Allows for either one or two drugs.
4 Executions are on hold due to court challenges.
5 Backup protocol uses two drugs.
6 Execution stayed so judge can evaluate protocol.
7 Allows for one, two, or three drugs.
8 Considering other drugs.
* Information for this chart reflects trends up to August 1, 2013 and comes from the following sources: State
by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenalty.org/state-lethal-injection
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014); Death Penalty Clinic. Univ of Cal., Berkeley, Sch. of Law, Execution Protocol
Information, LETHALINJECTION.ORG, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/dpclinic/LethalInjection/Litigators/li/
protocol.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).
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Idaho, Missouri, and Texas).170 So far, three states have switched from three
drugs to one in 2013 (Arkansas, Kentucky, and Louisiana).171
Like other states’ changes, Kentucky’s was prompted by efforts to quell
continuing litigation over the state’s three-drug protocol despite the outcome of
Baze.172 For example, from a resource standpoint, obtaining one drug is simpler
than three drugs; in addition, the process is presumably less risky because there
is just one injection and no controversial paralytic agent (pancuronium bro-
mide).173 At the same time, death by sodium thiopental alone typically takes
longer, and the procedure is less predictable because it is far less known.174
Regardless, perhaps the primary source of the one-drug method’s popularity
with states is that it was at least a move away from a three-drug process with its
long and documented record of trouble. In 2013, two-thirds of the lethal
injection executions used a one-drug protocol compared to one-half of the lethal
injection executions in 2012.175 Yet death-penalty states would soon encounter
an obstacle that the switch from three drugs to one drug would not alleviate: a
nationwide dearth of lethal injection drugs. More than any legal argument, this
practical challenge—one that the Baze Court could not have anticipated—would
threaten the continued use of lethal injection as this country’s primary method
of execution.
III. POST-BAZE DRUG SHORTAGES
In 2009, the United States confronted a national shortage of sodium thiopen-
tal when Hospira, Inc., the sole U.S. manufacturer of the drug, ceased produc-
tion due to difficulties procuring its active ingredient from another company.176
In late 2010, the British government announced plans to create an export
restriction that would ban the export of sodium thiopental to the United States
after learning that the drug would be solely used for executions.177 Hospira
originally intended to resume production of the drug at its plant in Italy, but
Italian authorities threatened legal action if Hospira could not successfully
170. See supra Charts 3 & 4.
171. See supra Charts 3 & 4.
172. As Franklin Circuit Judge Phillip Shepherd postulated, by moving to a one-drug protocol in
Kentucky, “any claims of cruel and unusual punishment by the inmates ‘will be rendered moot.’” Ky. to
Change Execution Method from 3 Drugs, FOX NEWS (June 1, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/
05/31/ky-to-change-execution-method-from-3-drugs/.
173. See supra note 155.
174. See supra note 155.
175. Compare Execution List 2013, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
execution-list-2013 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014), with Execution List 2012, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2012 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
176. See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“In 2009 the last domestic manufacturer of
thiopental stopped making it.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-194, supra note 26, at 14
fig.4, 21; Kevin Sack, Shortage of Widely Used Anesthetics Is Delaying Executions in Some States,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/us/30drug.html.
177. See Dominic Casciani, US Lethal Injection Drug Faces UK Export Restrictions, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 29, 2010, 13:47), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11865881.
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prevent the drug from “being diverted to departments of corrections for use in
capital punishment procedures.”178 Unwilling to risk potential liability, in January
2011, Hospira stopped manufacturing sodium thiopental entirely.179 Europe’s
prohibition of the death penalty had become an American problem.180
Hospira’s exit from the sodium thiopental market created the most serious
challenge yet to the continuation of lethal injection. The shortage of sodium
thiopental led prison officials to seek out questionable alternative sources of the
drug throughout the world, ranging from England to Pakistan.181 Until recently,
for example, the London wholesaler Dream Pharma Ltd. purchased sodium
thiopental manufactured in Austria and then shipped it to various states in the
United States for use in lethal injections.182 Such practices raised concerns that
prisoners may be injected with drugs that are impure, expired, unsafe, or
ineffective.183 It bears reminding that if sodium thiopental is ineffective and
does not render the inmate unconscious, that inmate is tortured by the injection
of the second and third drugs.184
Many death-penalty states experienced an onslaught of litigation challenging
the use of foreign-sourced sodium thiopental in lethal injection proceedings.185
Then in 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began to seize
some states’ supplies of foreign-sourced sodium thiopental on grounds that the
seized drugs did not meet importation standards. Other states voluntarily relin-
quished their supplies.186 But the most striking legal development occurred in
178. See Press Release, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Statement Regarding Pentothal™ (Sodium Thio-
pental) Market Exit (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c
175550&pirol-newsArticle&ID1518610&highlight.
179. See id.; Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, States Face Shortage of Key Lethal Injection Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/us/22lethal.html.
180. See Makiko Kitamura & Adi Narayan, Europe Pushes to Keep Lethal Injection Drugs From
U.S. Prisons, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 7, 2013), www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-07/
europe-pushes-to-keep-lethal-injection-drugs-from-u-dot-s-dot-prisons.
181. See “Lethal Injection Scramble” Map from ACLU of Northern California, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-moratorium-executions-ends-after-supreme-
court-decision (follow “‘Lethal Injection Scramble’ map from ACLU of Northern California” hyper-
link); see also Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., CDCR Documents Reveal “Secret Mission” to Acquire
Lethal Injection Drug (Dec. 10, 2010), available at https://www.aclunc.org/news/cdcr-documents-reveal-
secret-mission-acquire-lethal-injection-drug (noting that documents from the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation revealed “a global search for [lethal injection] drugs in places as
far-flung as Pakistan”).
182. See “Lethal Injection Scramble” Map from ACLU of Northern California, supra note 181.
183. See Beaty v. FDA, 853 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2012).
184. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
185. See Denno, supra note 89, at tbl.B.
186. See State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
state-lethal-injection (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Nebraska,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee received letters from the FDA in April 2012 requesting
the relinquishment of foreign-sourced sodium thiopental, in accordance with the U.S. district court’s
ruling in Beaty v. FDA. See id. Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, and Tennessee had
foreign-sourced sodium thiopental seized by the DEA in March or April 2011. See id. Arkansas turned
over its foreign-sourced sodium thiopental to the DEA in July 2011. See id. Both Beaty and Cook list
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee as states that received ship-
2014] 1361LETHAL INJECTION CHAOS POST-BAZE
March 2012. In Beaty v. FDA, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia ultimately banned the importation of sodium thiopental, finding that
the drug did not follow FDA regulations and exposed plaintiffs “to the risk that
the drug will not function as intended”; therefore, plaintiffs were able to show
“at least a ‘modest’ increment of risk that the use of foreign thiopental in their
executions would result in conscious suffocation, pain, and cardiac arrest.”187
On July 23, 2013, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Beaty with an unambiguous holding
in Cook v. FDA:
The FDA acted in derogation of [its] duties by permitting the importation
of thiopental, a concededly misbranded and unapproved new drug, and by
declaring that it would not in the future sample and examine foreign ship-
ments of the drug despite knowing they may have been prepared in an un-
registered establishment.188
As a consequence of Beaty, Cook, and the events leading up to both cases,
many death-penalty states amended their lethal injection protocols to either
replace sodium thiopental with pentobarbital or to allow a choice between the
two drugs.189 Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, pentobarbital was the primary drug
employed in executions by lethal injection.190 Pentobarbital, a drug most com-
monly used as a sedative or to control convulsions, was first used in a three-
drug lethal injection execution in Oklahoma in 2010191 and in a one-drug
execution in Ohio the following year.192 As Charts 3 and 4 of this Article show,
an unprecedented number of states—thirteen in total, including Ohio—switched
from sodium thiopental to pentobarbital in 2011 alone.193 Only Kentucky and
Louisiana changed thereafter—both in 2013.194
The quick switch to pentobarbital has done little, if anything, to address the
issues surrounding lethal injection. In fact, states’ inclusion of the drug in their
protocols has engendered a new wave of legal challenges.195 Much of the
ments of sodium thiopental from the United Kingdom pharmaceutical company, Dream Pharma Ltd.
See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Beaty, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 34–35. For further
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
187. 853 F. Supp. 2d at 32, 37, 41–43.
188. 733 F.3d at 12. The court did, however, reverse another portion of the lower court’s order and
enabled departments of corrections to retain the sodium thiopental that they already had in their
possession. See id.
189. See supra Charts 3 & 4.
190. See Execution List 2012, supra note 175; Execution List 2013, supra note 175.
191. See Robert Boczkiewicz, Appeals Court Rejects Convicted Killer’s Challenge to Oklahoma
Execution Method, NEWSOK (Dec. 15, 2010), http://newsok.com/court-rejects-convicted-killers-challenge-
to-oklahoma-execution-method/article/3523770.
192. See Mears, supra note 29; Rob Stein, Ohio Executes Inmate Using New, Single-Drug Method
for Death Penalty, WASH. POST (March 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/10/AR2011031006250_pf.html.
193. See supra Charts 3 & 4.
194. See supra Charts 3 & 4.
195. See, e.g., Arthur v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012); Jackson v. Danberg,
656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011); DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 2011); Powell v.
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litigation involves Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment chal-
lenges196 and is based in part on the sparse data available regarding the drug’s
effects on humans.197 Of the first eight documented pentobarbital challenges,
seven focused on the lack of substantial data concerning the efficacy of pento-
barbital as an execution drug—that is, whether or not it is actually successful in
anesthetizing the prisoner.198 In fact, it appears that the drug is not always
successful for that purpose; as some of the litigation notes, even the drug’s
manufacturers have cautioned against its use in lethal injection proceedings for
reasons related to politics, if not efficacy.199
Eighth Amendment challenges are not the only issue facing states with
pentobarbital protocols. As with sodium thiopental, states that have included
pentobarbital in their protocols have had great difficulty obtaining it. The
Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2011); Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1337–38 (10th Cir.
2010); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 538 (Fla. 2011); Verified Complaint at 3, Blankenship v. Owens,
No. 2011cv202236 (Ga. Super. Ct. June 20, 2011); see also cases cited supra note 112; David Beasley,
Georgia Executes Man for 1978 Rape and Murder, REUTERS (June 23, 2011, 9:11 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/06/24/us-execution-georgia-idUSTRE75N06P20110624 (“The Georgia Supreme
Court late Thursday unanimously rejected Blankenship’s last-minute request for a stay, including his
claim that using pentobarbital in the execution would cause undue pain and suffering.”).
196. See, e.g., Arthur, 674 F.3d at 1259 (noting plaintiff’s allegations that “pentobarbital takes
substantially longer to render an inmate fully insensate than sodium thiopental and, as a result of this
delayed effect, there is a significant risk that Alabama administers the second and third drugs in its
lethal injection procedure before pentobarbital has taken effect,” constituting cruel and unusual
punishment).
197. See id. at 1266–67 (Hull, J., dissenting) (quoting anesthesiologists’ declarations that pento-
barbital “is not approved by the FDA as an anesthesia induction agent,” that “there is no scientific
literature establishing the anesthetic dose of pentobarbital,” and that “[t]he switch to pentobarbital, for
which there is no clinical knowledge regarding its effects on human beings when rapidly administered
in high dosages to a conscious person, combined with the use of pancuronium bromide and potassium
chloride, confers a substantial risk of an excruciating and agonizing death process” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
198. See Arthur, 674 F.3d at 1259 (“Arthur alleges that pentobarbital takes substantially longer to
render an inmate fully insensate than sodium thiopental and, as a result of this delayed effect, there is a
significant risk that Alabama administers the second and third drugs in its lethal injection procedure
before pentobarbital has taken effect.”); Jackson, 656 F.3d at 162–63 (finding that the district court “did
not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a stay” based on Plaintiffs’ allegations that the
use of pentobarbital violates the Eighth Amendment); DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1327 (“DeYoung has
wholly failed to show that pentobarbital, once fully administered and allowed to act, is ineffective as an
anesthetic.”); Powell, 643 F.3d at 1304 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the “change from sodium
thiopental to pentobarbital[] is a substantial or significant change in the lethal injection protocol”);
Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1339–40 (upholding the district court’s denial of a stay of execution based on
inmate’s failure to “establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment
challenge to the . . . revised protocol” calling for the use of pentobarbital); Valle, 70 So. 3d at 538
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the “use [of] pentobarbital constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
because as a result of the substitution, he may remain conscious after being injected with pentobarbital,
thereby subjecting him to significant pain during the administration of the final two drugs”); Verified
Complaint, supra note 195, at 3 (“The administration of these drugs, particularly including Pento-
barbital, a drug which has not been tested for induction of anesthetic coma in humans, by unqualified
and untrained individuals creates a substantial risk of a botched and inhumane execution.” (footnote
omitted)).
199. See Valle, 70 So. 3d at 542.
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Danish manufacturer H. Lundbeck A/S (Lundbeck) worked vehemently to
prevent the use of its pentobarbital—which it sold for treatment of seizures—in
executions.200 Lundbeck announced in July 2011 that it “would require cus-
tomers to buy [pentobarbital] through a single wholesaler and to sign a form
confirming they won’t resell it, aren’t a prison, and know Lundbeck opposes
executions.”201 In December 2011, Lundbeck sold its pentobarbital rights to the
Illinois pharmaceutical company Akorn, Inc. but first insisted upon an agree-
ment that the drug would not be sold for the purpose of executing inmates.202
Although it is not entirely clear how much pentobarbital is still available,
ultimately it will either run out or expire.203
Like sodium thiopental, pentobarbital’s effects are most difficult to measure
when a state uses a three-drug protocol because the subsequent paralytic agent
(pancuronium bromide) can mask the first drug’s effects.204 Regardless, the first
three-drug execution using pentobarbital in Georgia—that of Roy Blankenship—
was so seriously botched205 that the next pentobarbital execution in Georgia—
that of Andrew Grant DeYoung—was videotaped as a safeguard.206 Notably, the
only other videotaped execution in this country’s history was the 1992 gas-
chamber execution of Robert Alton Harris in California due to that state’s
horrific problems with lethal gas.207
These events make clear that the use of pentobarbital in lethal injection
proceedings is not a lasting solution. Most likely, death-penalty states soon will
have to switch to yet a different drug, which will bring with it a host of new
200. See Press Release, H. Lundbeck A/S, Lundbeck Overhauls Pentobarbital Distribution Pro-
gram to Restrict Misuse (July 1, 2011), available at http://investor.lundbeck.com/releasedetail.cfm?
ReleaseID605775; Letter from Staffan Schu¨berg, President, H. Lundbeck A/S, to Gary C. Mohr, Dir.,
Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/LundbeckLethInj.pdf; Activities: Human Rights, LUNDBECK, http://www.lundbeck.com/global/
corporate-responsib/report/activities/human-rights (last updated Feb. 6, 2014).
201. Kitamura & Narayan, supra note 180; see David Jolly, Danish Company Blocks Sale of
Drug for U.S. Executions, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/europe/
02execute.html; Press Release, H. Lundbeck A/S, supra note 200.
202. See Leonard, supra note 28; Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/lethal-injection-moratorium-executions-ends-after-supreme-court-decision (last visited Feb. 18,
2014).
203. See Leonard, supra note 28 (“[T]hough some states may soon run out [of pentobarbital,] . . .
the drug could expire. Like most pharmaceuticals, pentobarbital has an expiration date of about
18 months.”).
204. See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text.
205. See Rachel Quigley, ‘He Suffered Greatly’: Medical Expert Describes How Prisoner
Thrashed Desperately During ‘Botched’ Execution with New Drug, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (June 30, 2011,
10:53 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2009873/He-suffered-greatly-Medical-expert-
describes-prisoner-thrashed-desperately-botched-execution-new-drug.html.
206. See Rhonda Cook, DeYoung Executed with Videographer Documenting His Death, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (July 22, 2011, 7:46 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/deyoung-executed-with-
videographer-documenting-his/nQJq5/; see also Deborah W. Denno, Should Executions Be Televised?,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2011/08/should-
executions-be-televised/ (discussing the history of televised executions).
207. See Dan Morain, Witness to the Execution: A Macabre, Surreal Event, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22,
1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-22/news/mn-509_1_gas-chamber.
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problems. In May 2012, for example, Missouri amended its lethal injection
protocol to permit the use of propofol in one-drug executions.208 Less than a
month after the drug’s adoption, concerns were raised about its implementa-
tion209 and on July 11, 2012, the United Kingdom announced its ban on the
exportation of propofol for execution purposes.210 In September 2012, the
German healthcare company Fresenius Kabi USA, a main supplier of propofol,
announced it would not sell the drug to corrections departments,211 thereby
following in the footsteps of restrictions on the sale of thiopental and pento-
barbital.212 Despite the drug’s unavailability, Missouri’s lethal injection protocol
included the use of propofol until October 2013, although it was never used in a
lethal injection procedure.213 No state other than Missouri has indicated plans to
adopt the drug.
Meanwhile, in May 2013, yet another drug company withdrew from the
lethal injection market. Hikma, a British pharmaceutical company that produces
phenobarbital, announced a plan to limit distribution of the drug in an effort to
prevent it from being considered as a potential new drug for executions. This
announcement came shortly after Arkansas declared its intent to be the first state
to employ phenobarbital for lethal injections214 in lieu of the other two execu-
tion drugs, pentobarbital or sodium thiopental, which most states currently use.
Phenobarbital has been prescribed to treat seizures but presumably has never
been used for executions in the United States, and some experts have expressed
their concern that it could have dire and unpredictable effects on inmates.215
According to the Arkansas Department of Corrections, it selected phenobarbital
after attorneys for several death-row inmates mentioned in a lawsuit that it
208. See Lethal Injection: Missouri Intends to Use Propofol in One-Drug Lethal Injection, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-missouri-intends-use-propofol-
one-drug-lethal-injection (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
209. See Jim Salter, Missouri Opts for Untested Drug for Executions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24,
2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/content/missouri-opts-untested-drug-executions-1 (“Litigation
over Missouri’s new protocol is possible. Attorneys for death row inmates told The Associated Press
that they are still gathering information on the new process and no decision has been made on whether
to seek an injunction.”).
210. See Juliette Jowit, UK to Ban Export of Drug Approved for Use in US Executions, GUARDIAN
(July 10, 2012, 15:00 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/10/uk-ban-export-drug-us-
executions.
211. See Letter from Scott Meacham, Exec. Vice President & Chief Commercial Officer, Fresenius
Kabi USA, LLC, to Healthcare Provider (Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/FreseniusPropofolStatement.pdf; Another Manufacturer Blocks Propofol for Execution Use,
USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2012, 3:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/09/27/
manufacturer-blocks-proprofol-execution-use/1598109/.
212. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
213. See State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 186.
214. See Press Release, Hikma Pharm. PLC, Hikma Pharmaceuticals Strongly Objects to the Use of
Its Products in Capital Punishment (May 15, 2013), available at http://www.hikma.com/en/media-
center/news-and-press-releases/all-news/2013/15-05-2013.aspx; Jeannie Nuss, Arkansas Turns to Differ-
ent Lethal Injection Drug, YAHOO NEWS (Apr. 19, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/arkansas-turns-
different-lethal-injection-drug-214639034.html.
215. See Press Release, Hikma Pharm. PLC, supra note 214.
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might be an available drug.216 The Department has revealed little other informa-
tion about the drug selection process apart from explaining that the agency also
consulted other medical sources, which it did not identify.217 In July 2013,
Arkansas still did not have a valid execution statute,218 and the Department of
Corrections had changed its mind about incorporating phenobarbital because it
could no longer acquire sufficient quantities of the drug.219 Indeed, death-
penalty states are becoming increasingly desperate in their efforts to procure
lethal injection drugs, and this practical challenge has subsumed many of the
issues addressed by the Baze Court.220
IV. THE HIGH-RISK ROLE OF COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES
Given the impact of drug shortages on lethal injection procedures,221 it
should come as no surprise that states are seeking help internally from local
compounding pharmacies for the production of lethal injection drugs.222 Yet
recent discoveries of subpar conditions and contaminated drugs demonstrate the
risk posed by compounding pharmacies. This risk provides states with an
incentive to keep their lethal injection protocols secret because of the foresee-
able challenges that they will face should it become known that the drugs are
coming from pharmacies of this kind. However, the nondisclosure of a lethal
injection protocol renders Baze moot because it becomes impossible to subject
that protocol to all of the requirements of Baze. Further, compounding pharma-
cies by their very nature run counter to the requirements of Baze because the
practices they engage in already pose a substantial risk.
Because of the heightened risk posed by compounding pharmacies, states
face a quandary: states use compounded drugs because they could not carry out
executions otherwise; yet they also recognize the risks associated with these
drugs, as well as the potential for legal challenges. As a result, states default to
secrecy regarding their protocols.
Yet there are also a number of reasons why states may view compounding
pharmacies as better suited than large-scale drug manufacturers for the job of
executing inmates. Most apparent is the reason discussed in Part III: large-scale
216. See Nuss, supra note 214.
217. See id.
218. See Death Penalty Clinic, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Sch. of Law, Execution Protocol Informa-
tion, LETHALINJECTION.ORG, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/dpclinic/LethalInjection/Litigators/li/
protocol.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).
219. See Jeannie Nuss, Dustin McDaniel: Options ‘Limited’ for Future of Arkansas Death Penalty,
ARK. BUS. (July 25, 2013, 7:13 AM), http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/93707/dustin-mcdaniel-
options-limited-for-future-of-arkansas-death-penalty?pageall.
220. See supra Part III.
221. See Tim Hoover, Wanted: Execution Drug, DENVER POST, Mar. 13, 2013, at A4; Ariane
de Vogue, Drug Shortage Disrupts Lethal-Injection Mix, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://abcnews.
go.com/Politics/death-penalty-drug-shortage-disrupts-execution-lethal-injection/story?id13148874;
State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 186.
222. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
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companies that are based in Europe but have subsidiaries in the United States
have been strictly prohibited from facilitating the death penalty in the United
States in any way.223 Even if they were permitted to do so, big pharmaceutical
companies would have a much larger reputation at stake when they considered
associating themselves with lethal injection.
Another key reason that states are turning to compounding pharmacies is the
lack of regulation compared to large-scale manufacturers.224 The latter are gov-
erned by strict FDA regulations, whereas compounding pharmacies fall under
the relatively lax authority of the states. In addition, state regulations tend to
differ from one state to the next, making it difficult to ensure that compounded
drugs are held to consistently high standards of quality, safety, and effective-
ness. These seemingly permissive regulations stem from the traditional view of
compounding pharmacies as small-scale productions that lend themselves to
easy quality control and present a low risk of public-health concerns.225 Yet
recent events suggest that this perspective may be outdated. The remainder of
Part IV provides a brief history of compounding pharmacies as well as a
discussion of current legislation aimed at improving oversight of these facilities.
A. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES
Traditionally, all compounded drugs were custom-made in small batches for
individual patients pursuant to a medical prescription.226 Physicians usually
prescribe compounded medications when commercial drugs are unavailable or
if the use of existing commercial alternatives is inhibited by allergies.227 When
compounding pharmacies were first conceived in the 1800s, they typically
served as the only source of prescription medication.228 Their prevalence was
somewhat diminished during the Industrial Revolution when mass drug-
manufacturing companies emerged with a superior capacity to produce generic
drugs,229 but those companies did not dominate the market until around 1950.230
Today, there are about 56,000 compounding pharmacies in the United States.231
Recent estimates show that approximately “3,000 facilities practice sterile
compounding and supply most of the injectable drugs in the United States.”232
Compounded drugs are prepared by licensed pharmacists who practice in a
licensed compounding pharmacy.233 Pharmacist licensure requirements are regu-
223. See supra Part III.
224. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
225. See Boodoo, supra note 32, at 232–34.
226. See The Special Risks of Pharmacy Compounding, FDA 1 (Dec. 2012), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM107839.pdf.
227. See id.
228. See DAVID L. COWEN & WILLIAM H. HELFAND, PHARMACY: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 186 (1990).
229. See id.
230. See Boodoo, supra note 32, at 222.
231. Hinkley, supra note 37, at 23.
232. Id.
233. See supra note 226; Pharmacy Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/
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lated by state pharmacy boards234 and therefore vary by state.235 However, all
pharmacists are required to pass a national, standardized licensure exam, and all
states require pharmacists to pass an examination on compounding.236
Compounded drugs must be prescribed to a patient by a licensed physician.
Providing such a prescription carries some risk. According to a recent article
published by the American Medical Association, many patients have success-
fully sued their doctors based on negligence and failure-to-warn claims with
respect to defective or dangerous compounded medications.237 Indeed, when
considering use of a compounding facility, doctors are often advised to weigh
the risk of liability, which is exacerbated by the fact that medical malpractice
insurance typically excludes coverage for claims involving medications and
procedures not approved by the FDA.238 The lack of FDA regulation is in fact
the very root of physician liability. Because compounding pharmacies are not
regulated by the FDA,239 they are “less legally secure than alternatives,” such as
regular pharmacies and regulated medications.240 Doctors are required to know
whether a given compounding pharmacy meets applicable safety standards.241
B. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES
In the early 1990s, the FDA became aware of compounding pharmacies
whose practices did not align with the traditional individualized, prescription-
based schema.242 In response to this discovery, the FDA issued a compliance
ucm339764 (last updated Dec. 2, 2013); see also Accreditation Council for Pharmacy Educ., Accredita-
tion Standards and Guidelines for the Professional Program in Pharmacy Leading to the Doctor of
Pharmacy Degree, ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR PHARMACY EDUCATION app. D, at xxii (2011), https://
www.acpe-accredit.org/pdf/finals2007Guidelines2.0.pdf (listing compounding as a competency that
pharmacy students should achieve before entering advanced pharmacy practice experiences).
234. See State Regulation of Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 37.
235. See Licensure Transfer, NAT’L ASS’N BOARDS PHARMACY, http://www.nabp.net/programs/licensure/
licensure-transfer (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (noting that each state board of pharmacy provides its
own set of requirements that a prospective pharmacist must meet before a license is issued and
providing a link to each state board of pharmacy for further information on their requirements).
236. See SCOTT GIBERSON ET AL., IMPROVING PATIENT AND HEALTH SYSTEM OUTCOMES THROUGH AD-
VANCED PHARMACY PRACTICE: A REPORT TO THE U.S. SURGEON GENERAL 26 (2011). In New York State, for
example, part III of the pharmacist licensing examinations is a written and practical examination in
which the pharmacist must complete written math compounding components as well as hands-on drug
compounding components. See License Requirements, N.Y. ST. EDUC. DEP’T, http://www.op.nysed.gov/
prof/pharm/pharmlic.htm#exam (last visited July 15, 2013).
237. See Alicia Gallegos, Physicians Entangled in Tainted Drugs Lawsuits, AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 11,
2013), http://www.amednews.com/article/20130211/profession/130219977/2.
238. See Jennifer Gudeman et al., Potential Risks of Pharmacy Compounding, 13 DRUGS R&D 1, 6
(2012), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40268-013-0005-9.
239. See Pharmacy Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, supra note 233 (“Com-
pounded drugs are not FDA-approved. This means that FDA does not verify the quality, safety and
effectiveness of compounded drugs.”).
240. Gallegos, supra note 237.
241. See id.
242. See OFFICE OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 33, at 5.
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guide in 1992,243 which effectively alerted compounding pharmacies that they
were not unconditionally exempt from FDA regulation: if a compounding
pharmacy’s actions exceeded its traditional scope, the FDA had the authority to
intervene.244 Five years later, however, the FDA acknowledged continued confu-
sion regarding the actual scope of that authority and worked with the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources to design legislation to clarify the
matter.245
In 1997, section 127 of the Federal Food and Drug Administration Moderniza-
tion Act (FDAMA)246 represented the first time that specific federal law gov-
erned the practices of compounding pharmacies. With unprecedented clarity, the
FDAMA distinguished drug manufacturers from compounding pharmacies and
listed nine requirements for classification as a true compounding pharmacy.247
These requirements stipulated the need to produce compounded drugs for
identified individual patients pursuant to a prescription from a licensed physi-
cian and prohibited the production of drugs that were effectively identical to
“commercially available drug product[s].”248 Pharmacies that met these require-
ments fell within the scope of regulatory exemptions that the FDA had created
for true compounding pharmacies249 and would not be required to register with
the FDA, obtain its approval, or comply with any manufacturing practices or
safety and efficacy standards.250 The FDA’s goal was to create a framework that
would enable true compounding pharmacies to continue to produce customized
drugs but prevent large-scale manufacturers from operating under the guise of
compounders.251
Since the passage of the FDAMA, several lawsuits and FDA actions have
triggered reexamination of the legislation but, rather remarkably, no substantial
changes have been made.252 Beginning in the early 2000s, however, the FDA
sent seventy-five publicly available warning letters to compounding phar-
macies in twenty-eight states as well as Puerto Rico, Canada, and Brazil, noting
a series of problems: failed inspections, the discovery of problematic com-
pounded drugs, potential and actual violations of the FDA regulations, failed
safety and efficacy standards, false or misleading statements, and other disturb-
243. See FDA, COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDES MANUAL § 460.200 (2002) (reissuing the compliance
guide concerning pharmacy compounding, which was originally issued in 1992).
244. See OFFICE OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 33, at 5.
245. See S. REP. NO. 105-43, at 67 (1997).
246. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 127, 111
Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997).
247. See id.
248. Id. at 2328–29.
249. See id. at 2328–30.
250. See Jessica Dye, Senate Committee Advances Drug Compounding Bill, REUTERS (May 22,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-fda-drugs-legislation-idUSBRE94L1AU20130522.
251. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-399, at 94 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
252. See STAFF OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 31, at 7.
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ing issues.253 As concern grew that some pharmacies were exceeding the scope
of traditional compounding practices,254 the FDA issued reports in 2003255 and
2006256 revealing the discovery of compounded drugs that failed safety and
efficacy tests, as well as serious illnesses and deaths that had occurred in
association with compounded drugs.257 Yet in 2007, legislation aimed at reassess-
ing and increasing the FDA’s limited authority over compounding pharmacies
was met with criticism and disregard. The prevailing notion remained that state
pharmacy boards were better equipped to regulate compounding pharmacies
than the FDA.258
By October 2012, however, sentiments had shifted. A contaminated steroid
produced by the New England Compounding Center (NECC) in Massachusetts
led to a fungal meningitis outbreak that has killed a current total of 64 people
and sickened 751 others across the nation.259 The facility that had compounded
the contaminated drug was alleged to be a prime example of a compounding
pharmacy operating like a drug-manufacturing company on a larger-than-
permissible scale, and the tragic public-health consequences triggered a new
receptiveness to increased oversight of compounding pharmacies.260
The FDA inspected thirty-one compounding pharmacies over the next six
months and made a series of disquieting discoveries:261 “unidentified black
particles floating in vials of supposedly sterile medicine; rust and mold in
‘clean rooms’ where sterile injectable medications were produced; technicians
handling supposedly sterile products with bare hands; and employees wearing
253. See FDA’s Electronic Reading Room—Warning Letters, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/
EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (search “To find specific Warning Letters” for
“Compounding Pharmacy”) (last visited July 19, 2013) (listing states that have received warning letters,
including Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Wyoming); see also OFFICE OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 33, app. A, at 19
(listing a detailed timeline of media reports and FDA enforcement actions on compounding pharmacies).
254. See JANET HEINRICH, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-195T, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
STATE AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF DRUG COMPOUNDING BY PHARMACIES 5 (2003).
255. See Report: Limited FDA Survey of Compounded Drug Products, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm155725.htm (last vis-
ited July 19, 2013).
256. See 2006 Limited FDA Survey of Compounded Drug Products, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm204237.htm (last visited
July 19, 2013).
257. See STAFF OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 31, at 8.
258. See Reid Paul, New Bill on Pharmacy Compounding Stirs Concern, MOD. MED. (Apr. 2, 2007),
http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.com/drug-topics/news/modernmedicine/modern-medicine-feature-
articles/new-bill-pharmacy-compounding-stirs.
259. Multi-State Meningitis Outbreak—Current Case Count, supra note 34. For more information
on the meningitis outbreak and the continually developing outcomes, see Gottlieb, Compound-
ing a Crisis at FDA, supra note 34.
260. See STAFF OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 31, at 10; see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
261. Summary: 2013 FDA Pharmacy Inspection Assignment, supra note 35.
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non-sterile lab coats.”262 Furthermore, a study released in April 2013 by the
U.S. House of Representatives revealed that almost all states provide grossly
inadequate and often altogether ineffective oversight and regulation of the
compounding pharmacies within their borders. Issues include poor record keep-
ing, a lack of uniformity among states, ignorance of dangerous processes and
products from other states, and minimal preventative and safety assurance
measures.263 In response to these findings, legislation has been proposed that
would require FDA approval of not only pharmacies engaged in interstate
commerce but also those involved in high-risk compounding.
As the FDA continues to explore methods of increasing its authority over
compounding pharmacies,264 state pharmacy boards are working hastily to im-
prove their regulatory systems in response to the negative attention. Proposed
state regulations include the following: stricter licensure requirements for local
compounding pharmacies and out-of-state pharmacies that deliver in state;
clearer definitions of compounding; additional inspection programs and re-
quirements; and the installment or improvement of prescription monitoring
programs.265
C. PROPOSED BILLS AND NEWLY ADOPTED LEGISLATION
Following the October 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak in Massachusetts,
several bills were proposed regarding the regulation of compounding phar-
macies.266 In large part, these bills address the question of which government
body should enforce regulations and penalize violations. Other features of the
bills include the need to clearly and consistently distinguish between the terms
“compounding” and “manufacturing”; the definitions of “compounding,”
“sterile,” and “non-sterile” practices; guidelines for the frequency, funding, and
performance of inspections; and the scope of transparency.267 The bills also
create three separate categories of pharmacies, distinguishing among those that
262. Hamburg, supra note 35. In her post, Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, the commissioner of the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), linked the summary of the 2013 FDA pharmacy inspection
assignment to reference the inspections conducted. See id. Reportedly, the FDA used “highly-skilled,
certified drug investigators who have specialized experience and specific training to evaluate pharmaceu-
tical production and determine a firm’s compliance with sterile production standards.” Summary: 2013
FDA Pharmacy Inspection Assignment, supra note 35. In the inspections, investigators observed “the
production environment, equipment used to make the drugs, the design of the facility, and personnel
practices and behavior.” Id. The FDA also interviewed the technicians who worked at each pharmacy to
learn about the operations, standard operating procedures, and products as well as the effectiveness of
any sterilization methods and drug stability programs. If necessary, investigators collected samples of
abnormalities and compliance failures. See id.
263. See STAFF OF REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY, supra note 31, at 2–3.
264. See Pollack, supra note 37.
265. See Hinkley, supra note 37, at 22, 23; State Regulation of Compounding Pharmacies, supra
note 37.
266. See State Regulation of Compounding Pharmacies, supra note 37.
267. Id.; see also Hinkley, supra note 37.
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engage in basic compounding and those that engage in high-risk sterile com-
pounding.268
In May 2013, the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions (HELP Committee) unanimously approved the Pharmaceutical Com-
pounding Quality and Accountability Act, clarifying which kinds of compound-
ing pharmacies are regulated by the state and which are regulated by the
FDA.269 The legislation distinguishes FDA-regulated drug manufacturers from
state-regulated small-scale traditional compounding pharmacies and separately
identifies large-scale compounding manufacturers who operate more like mass
drug producers.270 The bill then categorizes these large-scale businesses as
manufacturers, eliminating their pharmacy status altogether and removing their
ability to be licensed as such.271 If passed, the legislation would grant the FDA
full authority to be the sole regulator of these compounding manufacturers
through measures such as conducting regular inspections and ensuring that all
products manufactured are reported to the FDA.272 Under this bill, however,
compounding manufacturers still would not be subject to the same kinds of
regulations as traditional drug manufacturers under FDA authority because, for
example, drugs produced by these kinds of manufacturers are by their very
nature compounded rather than approved by the FDA.273 The HELP Committee
continues to urge the Senate to bring this legislation to the floor for a vote in
order to “prevent further tragedies.”274
On May 23, 2013, a House bill was proposed that also appears to close the
gap in FDA authority.275 The Verifying Authority and Legality in Drug Com-
268. High-risk sterile compounding is termed as such because the practice involves drug products
that require a heightened level of unique safeguards during compounding to prevent injury or death
to patients who receive them. See HEINRICH, supra note 254, at 3. “[S]terile compounding requires
cleaner facilities than nonsterile compounding, as well as specific training for pharmacy personnel and
testing of the compounded drug for sterility.” Id. Despite the many similarities among the bills, they do
vary in several important areas, including their definitions of true compounding and the requirements
needed to satisfy that classification.
269. See S. 959, 113th Cong. (2013).
270. Id. § 2.
271. See Memorandum from the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce Democratic Staff to the
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce Democratic Members & Staff, Subcomm. on Health (July 15,
2013) [hereinafter Memorandum from the House Comm.], available at http://democrats.energycommerce.
house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Memo-Health-Drug-Compounding-Reform-2013-7-15-pdf.
272. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, Senate Health
Committee Passes Alexander and Colleagues’ Bill to Fix Responsibility for Safety of Sterile Com-
pounded Drugs (May 22, 2013), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id
63b96a98-9b19-4c5f-8a6f-b0df57afe138.
273. See Dye, supra note 250; Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, &
Pensions, supra note 272.
274. Press Release, Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, Health Committee Leaders
Urge Senate Vote on Compounding Legislation “to Prevent Further Tragedies” (June 9, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?idc57674f7-e3cf-4d1c-a119-7d3cabd
78013.
275. See Verifying Authority and Legality in Drug (VALID) Compounding Act of 2013, H.R. 2186,
113th Cong. (2013).
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pounding Act of 2013 (VALID Compounding Act) also separates pharmacies
into three categories and recognizes that small traditional compounding pharma-
cies that produce drugs for an “identified individual patient” should remain
under the authority of the state.276 However, the VALID Compounding Act still
acknowledges large-scale compounders as pharmacies, in contrast to the Senate
bill.277 The legislation seeks to give the FDA exclusive authority over com-
pounding pharmacies that ship products across state lines or engage in “high-
risk sterile compounding,”278 whereas other compounding pharmacies must
follow different FDA regulations in addition to state regulations.279 Compound-
ing pharmacies would be subject to inspections, reporting, and labeling require-
ments.280 The VALID Compounding Act does create exceptions for compounding
manufacturers to produce non-patient-specific drugs and commercially available
drugs under certain circumstances, including the ability to compound drugs
listed on the drug shortage list or drugs that are “necessary to protect public
health or wellbeing.”281
The House also proposed a second bill, the Compounding Clarity Act of 2013
(Clarity Act), which is a discussion draft authored by Representative Morgan
Griffith.282 Like both the Senate bill and the VALID Compounding Act, this
legislation recognizes that traditional pharmacy compounding is a separate
practice that should remain subject to only state regulation and exempt from
various FDA regulations.283 Similar to the other bills, the Clarity Act creates a
new category for nontraditional compounding pharmacies that do not operate
like a traditional, small-scale compounding pharmacy.284
The Clarity Act, however, differs from the other bills regarding what kind of
pharmacy is considered a “traditional compounding pharmacy” and what regula-
tions those pharmacies must follow. For example, the Clarity Act creates a
broad exception allowing traditional compounding pharmacies to compound
both limited and unlimited quantities of drugs in advance of a prescription,
subject to a variety of specific terms, whereas the Senate bill has a similar but
much more limited provision, particularly with respect to the unlimited-
276. Id.
277. See Memorandum from the House Comm., supra note 271.
278. As defined by the VALID Compounding Act, “‘high-risk sterile compounding’ means compound-
ing sterile drug products using nonsterile ingredients, nonsterile devices, or nonsterile components.”
H.R. 2186 § 2.
279. See H.R. 2186; Updated House Bill Would Require FDA to Regulate Pharmacies Involved in
High-Risk Compounding and Interstate Commerce, NAT’L ASS’N BOARDS PHARMACY (June 5, 2013),
http://www.nabp.net/news/updated-house-bill-would-require-fda-to-regulate-pharmacies-involved-in-
high-risk-compounding-and-interstate-commerce.
280. See H.R. 2186.
281. Id. § 2.
282. See Compounding Clarity Act, H.R. 3089, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr3089ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr3089ih.pdf.
283. See id.
284. See id.
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quantities portion.285 In even sharper contrast, the VALID Compounding Act
strictly requires that a drug only be compounded pursuant to a valid and existent
prescription, without exception.286 Finally, the Clarity Act has not yet provided
much detail on what kind of pharmacy would be identified as a large-scale-
manufacturing compounding pharmacy or what regulations manufacturing com-
pounders must follow.287
On July 16, 2013, the Subcommittee on Health of the U.S. House Energy and
Commerce Committee held a hearing to discuss all three proposed bills and
examine their differences as well as the general need for stricter compounding
regulation.288 At the hearing, a representative from the National Association of
Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) testified regarding the proposed compounding
regulatory bills.289 The representative’s statements provided a great deal of
support for the Senate bill, specifically with respect to the distinction between a
compounding pharmacy and a compounding manufacturer and the clarity af-
forded by the provision to prohibit compounding manufacturers from becoming
licensed as pharmacies.290 Additionally, the NABP representative stated that the
House bills seemed too permissive and left open several gaps for businesses to
potentially operate as licensed compounding pharmacies despite being engaged
in large-scale compounded-drug manufacturing.291
Irrespective of these efforts, it was not until November 2013 that the final
piece of proposed legislation—the “Drug Quality and Security Act”—was
passed by both the House and the Senate.292 Introduced at the end of September,
the Act clarifies current federal law about pharmacy compounding so that a
uniform, nationwide standard may be applied to compounding pharmacies.293
Although other bills had proposed it, the Drug Quality and Security Act marks
the first piece of passed legislation that separates regulation of traditional
small-scale compounding pharmacies from large-scale compounders that oper-
ate more like pharmaceutical manufacturers. The Act leaves regulation over
traditional compounding pharmacies in the hands of the states, subject to the
same FDA Compliance Policy guidance that they have adhered to since 2002.
The Act refers to these large-scale compounding manufacturers as outsourcing
facilities and provides voluntary federal registration for outsourcing facilities,
set to begin in fiscal year 2015. These facilities will be permitted to compound
285. See Memorandum from the House Comm., supra note 271.
286. See H.R. 2186.
287. See Memorandum from the House Comm., supra note 271.
288. See Reforming the Drug Compounding Regulatory Framework: Hearing on H.R. 2186,
H.R. 3089, and S. 959 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
113th Cong. (2013).
289. See id. (statement of Carmen Catizone, Executive Director, National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy).
290. See id. at 2, 4.
291. See id. at 3.
292. Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, H.R. 3204, 113th Cong. (2013).
293. See id.
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bulk quantities of drugs on the FDA’s drug shortage list, in addition to other
drugs that are on a “‘clinical need’ list to be established by the FDA, without a
prescription, as well as distribute these formulations out of state without limita-
tion.”294 Registered outsourcing facilities will be subject to FDA oversight
similar to that of regular pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States.295
Under the Act, outsourcing facilities will have to identify themselves for the
FDA, enabling the FDA to know what kinds of pharmaceuticals each outsourc-
ing facility is making and to receive event reports about all of the compounded
drugs.296 The FDA’s regulation powers will also grant them the authority to
conduct risk-based inspections.297 Further, certain drugs will be listed as prohib-
ited from being compounded at these facilities.298 The Act has been widely
endorsed by many national health organizations299 and by President Obama.300
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEATH-PENALTY STATES
Heightened regulation of compounding pharmacies seems inevitable under
both state and federal law. This regulation is unlikely to further the goals of
death-penalty states for a number of reasons. For example, the proposed VALID
Compounding Act prohibits even small, state-regulated pharmacies from produc-
ing copies or effective copies of commercial drugs, no matter the quantity and
with few exceptions.301 This limitation would be problematic for states seeking
lethal injection drugs, given that many such drugs are simply high doses of
commercially available medication.302 Another notable aspect of general com-
pounding regulation is its strict prescription requirements, which should pro-
hibit a compounding pharmacy from issuing a supply of lethal injection drugs.303
Instead, a physician must specifically order a prescription for an identified,
individual patient in advance of the drug being compounded, which would raise
the issue of finding a licensed physician willing to write a prescription for an
execution drug.304 As previously discussed, physicians who write compounded
294. Press Release, Imprimis Pharmaceuticals Inc., Imprimis Optimistic After Congressional Pas-
sage of the Drug Quality and Security Act (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-
CO-20131119-905263.html?dsky.
295. See H.R. 3204.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See Press Release, Ranking Member Lamar Alexander, Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor,
and Pensions, HELP Committee Members Call for Senate Passage of Drug Quality and Security Act
(Sept. 28, 2013), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?idcce67150-6a23-
454e-a60c-09643348c6e0; Sabrina Tavernise, Bill on Drug Compounding Clears Congress a Year After
a Meningitis Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at A15.
300. See Kevin Outterson, The Drug Quality and Security Act—Mind the Gaps, 370 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 97, 97 (2014).
301. See H.R. 2186.
302. See State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 186.
303. See id.
304. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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drug prescriptions are already placing themselves at considerable risk for
liability.305 Physicians who participate in executions also face a broad range of
potential repercussions, a topic discussed in depth elsewhere.306 Presumably,
writing a prescription would qualify as participation.
Whether under state or federal oversight, compounding pharmacies may
soon also face an unprecedented barrage of regulations and requirements that
will complicate every aspect of their operations, ranging from systems of
communication, to sterilization procedures, to the need for lengthy and strict
memorandums with each individualized prescription.307 Additional complica-
tions associated with producing lethal injection drugs, such as the Drug Quality
and Security Act’s extensive requirements for tracking and tracing drug prod-
ucts, may be too great a burden. Perhaps most significantly, however, these
regulations would require an unprecedented degree of transparency from death-
penalty states regarding their execution methods. Although the exact specifica-
tions are yet to be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, it
seems that it would be challenging for a correctional facility to maintain the
secrecy of its pharmaceutical supplier because it would be up to the pharmacy
itself to disclose all of its transaction history. Death-penalty states have a history
of gravitating toward secrecy when their execution methods are questioned,308
yet these regulations may hinder them from doing so.
V. POST-BAZE SECRECY
As states hone in on local compounding pharmacies as potential sources of
lethal injection drugs, they are becoming increasingly less willing to share
information about executions with the public, which raises the disturbing pos-
sibility that states are knowingly trying to hide the risks associated with com-
pounded drugs. South Dakota, after switching to a one-drug protocol and
carrying out an execution in October 2012, was said to have obtained its order
of pentobarbital from a local compounding pharmacy.309 Alarmingly, the com-
pounded drug was contaminated with fungus310—a discovery that was made
only because the drug was analyzed after the inmate began snoring and then
305. See supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text.
306. See generally Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1.
307. See Verifying Authority and Legality In Drug Compounding Act of 2013, H.R. 2186, 113th
Cong. (2013).
308. See Denno, Getting to Death, supra note 1, at 352–54, 385–86; Denno, Lethal Injection
Quandary, supra note 1, at 94–95; Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 1, at 64 n.2.
309. See Press Release, Reprieve, South Dakota Carries Out Execution Using Contaminated Com-
pounded Drugs (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2012_10_17_compound_pharmacy_
death_penalty/; State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 186.
310. See Press Release, Reprieve, South Dakota Covers Up Source of ‘DIY’ Death Penalty Drugs
Ahead of Execution (Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2012_10_30_South_
Dakota_execution_drugs/ (providing a link to the certificate of analysis “showing that the ingredients
used to make South Dakota’s execution drugs were contaminated”).
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remained open-eyed as he was executed.311 Shortly after the South Dakota
execution, Pennsylvania also announced that it would be using compounded
drugs in its lethal injection protocol for an execution the following month.312
That announcement came only after enormous judicial pressure, including two
federal court orders to disclose the drug source in a ruling pursuant to a class
action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the state’s protocol.313 The
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections initially refused to reveal the identity
of their drug supplier because they feared disclosure would lead to public
pressure on the pharmacy to withdraw its agreement to provide the drugs.314
Indeed, it seems that states are keenly aware that their difficulties in obtaining
lethal injection drugs stem largely from transparency issues and thus seek to
block that transparency at every turn.
This secrecy regarding lethal injection practices and risk is particularly
troublesome given that the number of states reaching out to compounding
pharmacies is only increasing. In March 2013, the Colorado Department of
Corrections sent a letter to almost one hundred local compounding phar-
macies seeking to “acquire sodium thiopental or other equally or more effective
substance to cause death” in accordance with state law.315 In July 2013, Georgia
became the fourth state to join the effort, acknowledging the increasing diffi-
culty of obtaining lethal injection drugs after its existing supply of pentobarbital
expired in March.316 When the Georgia Department of Corrections revealed in
July 2013 that it would use a compounding pharmacy to obtain its supply of
pentobarbital for an upcoming execution, that information was only acquired
from an email received through an open-records request.317 In March 2013,
Georgia passed the Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, enabling the identities of lethal
injection suppliers to be shielded from disclosure to the public and the media—
and possibly even the judiciary.318 According to the Act’s provisions, this
information is considered a “state secret.”319 Several states have proposed or
passed new regulations that exclude the death-penalty protocol from required
311. See South Dakota Murderer Executed by Lethal Injection for Beating to Death Prison Guard
with Pipe During Botched Escape, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 15, 2012, 23:49 EST), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2218181.
312. See Donald Gilliland, Pennsylvania Gets Its Execution Drugs from Same Type of Pharmacy
as the One Responsible for Bacterial Meningitis Outbreak, PENN LIVE (Nov. 06, 2012, 7:45 AM),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/11/pennsylvania_gets_its_executio.html.
313. See id.
314. See Donald Gilliland, Lawsuit Has Potential to Stay All Executions in Pennsylvania, PENN LIVE
(Nov. 5, 2012, 6:27 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/11/pennsylvania_death_
row.html.
315. Hoover, supra note 221.
316. See Kate Brumback, Georgia to Use Compounding Pharmacy for Execution Drug, AUGUSTA
CHRON. (July 11, 2013), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2013-07-11/georgia-use-compounding-
pharmacy-execution-drug.
317. See id.
318. See H.B. 122, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013).
319. Id.
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disclosure, thereby keeping both the method itself as well as the source phar-
macy, compounding or otherwise, completely confidential.320
Certain states have addressed this issue more candidly than others. An
Arkansas bill that was approved in February 2013 simply addresses all matters
of lethal injection administration and provides that all execution procedures
are not subject to disclosure under the state’s Freedom of Information Act.321
Similarly, a Tennessee bill passed in April 2013 expanded the existing law that
broadly protects the identity of individuals who have been or may be involved
in an execution to include protecting the identity of entities as well.322 A South
Dakota bill passed in February 2013 is a bit more explicit, openly stating that
the Act’s specific purpose is to “protect the identity of the person or entity
supplying” the lethal injection drug.323
In spite of compelling public interest in ensuring that lethal injection proto-
cols are acceptable, legal, and constitutional (not to mention the First Amend-
ment right of access to certain information, including the viewing of executions),
custom and in some cases state regulation dictate that the identities of execution
teams are concealed.324 States profess crucial reasons to shield the identities of
all parties who are involved in the lethal injection process, including doctors,
pharmacists, drug providers, wholesalers, retailers, or manufacturers.325 Cur-
rently the American Medical Association, American Nurses’Association, Ameri-
can Society of Anesthesiologists, and National Commission on Correctional
Health Care all have ethical rules and guidelines opposing participation in lethal
injections.326 Without guaranteed anonymity, states argue, companies and medi-
cal professionals would be disinclined to assist the state with its execution
duties for fear of a blight on their personal or professional reputations, while
executioners and correctional facilities might face threats from death-penalty
opponents.327 Yet these fears are carryovers from past methods of execution,
which employed a substantially smaller execution team. In contrast, lethal
injections involve multiple participants,328 none of whom presumably is wholly
responsible for the execution, including the producer of the lethal injection
320. See infra notes 321–23 and accompanying text.
321. See S. 237, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
322. See S. 154, 108th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
323. S. 36, 88th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2013).
324. See Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identities: Toward Recognizing a Right to Know Who Is Hiding
Beneath the Hood, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2796 n.39 (2007).
325. See id. at 2799–2800.
326. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 53–59, 77–91.
327. See Roko, supra note 324, at 2809–12; see also State Appeals Stay of Execution in Hill Case,
WALB NEWS (July 26, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.walb.com/story/22943909/state-appeals-stay-of-
execution-in-hill-case (noting state attorneys’ contention that “a new state law barring the release of
information about where Georgia obtains its execution drug. . . . [is] necessary to discourage retaliation
against those who take part in executions”).
328. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 56.
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drugs.329
Given states’ current desperation to obtain such drugs, the need for states to
ensure safe and constitutional practices with regard to procurement and protocol
far outweighs antiquated notions regarding the perceived risk to a lone execu-
tioner. Greater transparency of the entire lethal injection process is a feasible
solution. Indeed, my own research indicates that in modern times, death-penalty
states’ aversion to transparency is far more rooted in the desire to conceal
inconsistencies and incompetence.330
In 2001, I conducted a nationwide study of lethal injection protocols for all
thirty-six states that used the method at that time (Study One). Study One
focused on a number of key criteria common to many lethal injection protocols,
including the types and amounts of chemicals that are injected; the selection,
training, and qualifications of the lethal injection team; and the involvement of
medical personnel. One of Study One’s most problematic findings, however,
was that the criteria set out in many of the protocols were far too vague to allow
for adequate assessment. When the protocols did offer details, such as the
amount and type of chemicals that executioners inject, they often revealed
striking errors and a shocking level of ignorance about the procedure.331 Four
years later, in 2005, I conducted a second nationwide study (Study Two). One of
the goals of Study Two was to determine if states had changed their protocols
during the years in which lethal injection litigation gained traction. In other
words, Study Two provides a snapshot of lethal injection protocols at a key
point in time—at the cusp of the increased scrutiny of protocols but prior to the
onslaught of lethal injection challenges starting in 2006.332
For the most part, I found that over the four-year period between Study One
and Study Two, states typically withheld more information than in the past. For
example, one aspect of Study Two showed that the number of states with
complete protocols fell to less than one-third of the Study One numbers. In
addition, in Study Two, the number of states claiming confidentiality about their
protocols increased nearly fourfold. Likewise, in Study Two, two states said
protocols did not exist and one state provided no information whatsoever. In
total, one-half of the states that applied lethal injection did not allow any
329. The possible usage of compounded drugs, however, introduces a new component into the
execution process because of the heightened risk of problems associated with compounding pharma-
cies. Specifically, certain compounding pharmacies have been found to encounter serious dosage errors,
delivering drugs with up to 450% of the prescribed dosage. See Gilliland, supra note 312. Even further,
there are significant compliance and contamination issues already associated with compounded drugs,
evidenced by the recent reports revealed after the 2013 FDA investigation. See Hamburg, supra note
35.
330. See generally Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1 (detailing the challenges with
lack of transparency in this country’s execution processes).
331. See generally Denno, When Legislatures Delegate, supra note 1 (explaining and analyzing the
results of Study One).
332. See Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 1, at 91–101 (explaining and analyzing the
results of Study Two).
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evaluation of their protocols, either because the information is confidential or
nonexistent.333
In 2008, death-penalty states had safety in numbers because, at least superfi-
cially, they appeared to follow essentially the same kind of protocol in terms of
lethal injection drug usage.334 By 2013, however, there is a hodgepodge of
protocols among states that has no parallel prior to Baze, whether that compari-
son is being made relative to 2008 or 1977 or as far back as 1890.335 The lethal
injection procedure is more dangerous and inconsistent than ever, and the result
is a perpetual effort by states to maintain secrecy at a time when transparency is
most paramount.
Recognizing this need for transparency, state justice departments have started
to intervene. In 2011, the Chief Deputy Attorney General of Delaware ordered
that the state Department of Corrections violated the Freedom of Information
Act336 by denying a request from a reporter for access to all information
regarding its purchase and inventory of pentobarbital and sodium thiopental.337
A year later in Texas, Assistant Attorney General Sean Opperman ordered the
Department of Criminal Justice to respond to requests for public access to
information regarding the amount of a specific lethal injection drug in the
Department’s possession as well as information about the lethal injection proto-
col.338 He acknowledged that such information is not considered confidential
under the state code in conjunction with a physical safety exception recognized
by the Texas Supreme Court one year earlier339 and concluded that the informa-
tion is not exempt from public disclosure. Opperman further stated that safeguard-
ing the identity of the Department’s suppliers of lethal injection drugs so that
they are free from harassment and harm by certain interest groups is not a
compelling enough reason to inhibit access. In June 2013, a federal judge ruled
that the Louisiana Department of Corrections is required to publicly disclose
details of its intended death-penalty protocol, including inventory records, the
drugs to be used, and expiration dates issued by the supplying pharmacy.340
Most recently, an Atlanta circuit judge granted injunctive relief to a death-row
inmate who challenged Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act as a violation of
333. Id. at 96–101.
334. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 1, 39 and accompanying text.
336. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, ch. 100 (2003).
337. See Freedom of Information Act Appeal Concerning Department of Correction, Del. Op. Att’y
Gen. 11-IIB14 (2011), 2011 WL 4062225.
338. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-07088 (2012), 2012 WL 1821071.
339. Id. “[F]reedom from physical harm is an independent interest protected under law, untethered to
the right of privacy.” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d
112, 117 (Tex. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
340. See Della Hasselle, State Must Reveal Details of Death-Penalty Practices, Federal Magistrate
Rules, LENS (June 5, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://thelensnola.org/2013/06/05/state-must-reveal-details-of-death-
penalty-practices-federal-judge-rules/.
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his due process rights in a potential Eighth Amendment claim.341 As a result, the
court found unacceptable the potential for the death-row inmate to be barred
from any knowledge about the drugs, including whether they would facilitate an
execution that is cruel and unusual.342
In May 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Colorado sued
the Colorado Department of Corrections over the secrecy of its death-penalty
procedures and asked the court to compel the Department to make publicly
available information pertaining to agreements with lethal injection drug pharma-
cies as well as details of its execution protocol.343 On August 1, 2013, a district
court judge ordered the Department to release a redacted version of its execu-
tion protocol, reasoning that it would facilitate a necessary public discussion of
the death penalty in Colorado.344 However, the judge decided that details about
the drug supplier should be part of the redacted information.345 The judge
rejected the ACLU request for the Department to release the identity of the
source of the drugs, specifically reasoning that exposing the pharmacy could
negatively impact their business or employees, “which far outweighs” the need
for public disclosure.346 Yet the judge’s decision contrasts sharply with develop-
ments in other states which allow scrutiny of the drug supplier and the drug
protocol, not just the protocol alone. Providing cover solely to compounding
pharmacies—now such a key component of the lethal injection process—fails
to recognize the complex interdependency among the many different partici-
pants in the machinery of death. No participant should be holding secrets.
CONCLUSION
Lethal injection is this country’s primary method of execution, yet its imple-
mentation is chaotic and its future is unclear. This Article’s point-in-time
snapshot provides an overview of the multiple factors that have contributed to
the prevailing state of confusion. The Supreme Court has done little to clarify
matters—the Baze Court left key questions regarding lethal injection unan-
swered, and the issues that the Court did address have been rendered moot by
341. See Hill v. Owens, No. 2013-CV-233771, slip op. at 7 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed July 18, 2013),
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/HillStayOrder.pdf.
342. See id. at 2–4. The state had filed an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court seeking to overturn
the lower court decision. See State Appeals Stay of Execution in Hill Case, supra note 327. On
February 17, 2014, the Georgia Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the state’s appeal; a ruling is
expected sometime in summer 2014. See Max Blau, Georgia’s Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in
Warren Hill Appeal, CREATIVE LOAFING (Feb. 17, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.clatl.com/freshloaf/archives/
2014/02/17/georgias-supreme-court-hears-oral-arguments-in-warren-hill-appeal.
343. See Karen Auge´, ACLU Suit: Public Is Entitled to Know How Nathan Dunlap Will Be Killed,
DENVER POST (May 21, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_23291066/aclu-
suit-public-is-entitled-know-how-nathan.
344. See ACLU of Colo. v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 13CV32325 (Dist. Ct., City & Cnty. of Denver,
Colo. filed Aug. 1, 2013), available at http://aclu-co.org/case/aclu-v-colorado-department-of-corrections.
345. See Judge: Redacted Execution Protocol Can Be Released, CBS DENVER (Aug. 1, 2013,
6:40 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2013/08/01/judge-redacted-execution-protocol-can-be-released/.
346. See ACLU of Colo., No. 13CV32325.
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unanticipated obstacles such as the shortage of lethal injection drugs. More than
any legal argument, this practical impediment jeopardizes the use of lethal
injection as a method of execution. As death-penalty states turn to increasingly
nontraditional sources of drugs, such as compounding pharmacies, they face
overwhelming criticism and legal challenges. In response, they have intensified
their efforts to obscure information regarding the development and implementa-
tion of their lethal injection protocols.
Indeed, as risk and confusion surround lethal injection procedures, the only
overarching constant appears to be states’ desire for secrecy regarding execution
practices. Amidst the chaos of drug shortages, changing protocols, legal chal-
lenges, and botched executions, states are unwavering in their desire to conceal
this disturbing reality from the public. In fact, the current chaos may be viewed
at least in part as a repercussion of that reticence: any efforts to fix the system
via legal challenges and legislation are hindered by the difficulty in gathering
enough information to even understand its problems. Until death-penalty states
are willing to focus more on solutions than secrecy, lethal injection as a method
of execution will remain mired in an endless cycle of difficulty and disorder.
1382 [Vol. 102:1331THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
